Iran’s Revolution: The Distance Between Rhetoric and Resistance

By M. Davar
February 2026

Executive Summary

This paper examines competing visions for political change in Iran and evaluates them against the record of recent regime change efforts. Its central conclusion is clear: durable political transition depends on internal organization, legitimacy, and sustained participation from within society. External intervention, even when militarily effective, has repeatedly produced fragmentation, dependency, or collapse rather than stable governance.

The paper begins by distinguishing between opposition inside Iran and opposition in exile. Inside the country, resistance is physical and costly, expressed through protests, strikes, imprisonment, and death. Outside Iran, opposition is largely rhetorical, conducted through media, conferences, and advocacy from positions of safety. These two forms of opposition operate under different realities and cannot be treated as equivalent. Iran’s future will be decided inside the country. External actors can only play a supporting role.

To ground this claim, the paper analyzes five major cases of regime change and transition: Iran in 1979, Afghanistan after 2001, Iraq after 2003, Libya after 2011, and Syria from 2011 through 2025. The contrast is consistent. Iran’s 1979 transition succeeded because it was executed internally and relied on existing social and institutional networks. Afghanistan and Iraq collapsed once foreign military and financial support was withdrawn. Libya demonstrates the danger of regime removal without state reconstruction, while Syria shows how a state can survive while the country itself is devastated and fragmented.

From these cases, a common lesson emerges. Governments cannot be engineered from afar. Political order cannot be imposed by force or designed in conference rooms. Removing a regime is often easier than governing what follows.

The paper then evaluates two Iranian opposition models. The first, associated with Reza Pahlavi and monarchist groups, relies heavily on foreign pressure, media amplification, and the expectation of external military intervention. This model is found to be structurally weak. It lacks organizational depth inside Iran, commands no force or administrative capacity, and depends on external actors with little incentive to install an external figure lacking domestic legitimacy.

The second model is the Resistance, a broad constellation of forces operating primarily inside Iran. It includes labor unions, student groups, ethnic organizations, professional associations, and political networks. Despite severe repression and limited resources, the Resistance has demonstrated sustained mobilization through protests and strikes, including during the Mahsa movement. It rejects one-man rule and consistently separates national interest from regime survival. Its central strength lies in internal presence, risk sharing, and social embedding.

Building on this assessment, the paper proposes the formation of an Iranian Resistance Union (IRU). The IRU would function as a coalition rather than a hierarchy. It would coordinate resistance forces across regions and sectors, establish shared principles, and pursue a long-term strategy of sustained pressure. Decision making would be based on majority consensus. Actions would be announced openly, while execution would remain decentralized and locally managed. The strategy is framed as a war of attrition, gradually eroding the state’s capacity to repress.

The paper concludes that Iran’s political future is unlikely to emerge from a single leader or imposed authority. Iran’s diversity and history point instead toward a coalition or national front model, similar in structure to Eastern Europe in 1989. Such an approach will take longer to suceed, but it is the only path that preserves sovereignty and avoids repeating the failures of externally driven regime change.

Iran’s Revolution: The Distance Between Rhetoric and Resistance

Calls for overthrowing Iran’s government sound from both within the country and beyond its borders, yet they form no unified chorus. Inside Iran, the call is etched in courage and sacrifice. It rises from the streets where people protest, knowing they may dodge bullets and face death to make their grievances known. Theirs is a physical struggle, a daily confrontation. Outside Iran, the call often comes from a place of exile, from TV panel discussions, conference halls, and the living rooms of those who fled in search of safety or opportunity. It is voiced in analysis, hope, and the occasional rally among friends. These appeals do not carry the same weight, for they spring from two entirely different realities and visions for Iran. The sacrifice each group offers is profoundly different. Those inside Iran embody a resistance that is immediate and absolute. In a spirit echoing Mario Savio’s 1964 speech, they lay “their bodies upon the gears, upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus” to stop the machinery of the state itself. Those outside, wage a battle of words and longing. To put it all in the right perspective, the people of Iran will be determining their own future and writing their own story; the role of those afar is strictly supportive, their will subordinate, their part that of facilitators amplifying a narrative whose plot, characters, and ultimate resolution are authored solely from within.

Case Studies in Regime Change and Transition

Opposition groups are developing plans for overthrowing the Khamenei government and managing what comes next. Each group builds its approach around its own strengths and limits. Most also look to recent regime change efforts for guidance. The most cited cases are Iran in 1979, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011, and Syria from 2011 through 2025. These experiences point to very different outcomes. Together, they offer clear lessons about what works and what fails.

Iran (1979): An Internally Executed Transition

Iran’s 1979 revolution remains the most relevant internal example of political transition. After the Shah was removed and Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran, a process already in motion moved quickly into execution. Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan to lead a provisional government. At the same time, he avoided dismantling the existing state. The regular army remained intact. Core ministries continued to function. Rather than destroying institutions, the new leadership built parallel structures alongside them. Political authority was consolidated through newly created bodies. The Revolutionary Council assumed overarching control. At the local level, Islamic Revolutionary Committees, known as Komiteh, took charge of neighborhoods, workplaces, and public order. These committees operated immediately and independently. They gave the new regime direct reach on the ground. In parallel, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was formed as a separate military and intelligence force. It operated outside the regular army. Soon after, the Basij emerged as a mass paramilitary organization under IRGC command. Its role was internal security, social enforcement, and the suppression of dissent. These forces ensured rapid consolidation of power. Additional institutions reinforced this parallel system. The Jihad of Construction extended state presence into rural areas and mobilized support among poorer communities. The Assembly of Experts was formed to draft a new Islamic constitution and formalize the emerging political order. Together, these bodies created a parallel state that quickly became dominant.

Institutions alone, however, did not guarantee success. Khomeini also enjoyed considerable support of people. He was widely viewed as independent of both Western and Eastern powers. He promised dignity and social justice to groups marginalized under the Shah. These messages resonated across social classes. Most importantly, Khomeini commanded a disciplined and organized network embedded throughout Iranian society. His execution team was not improvised. It consisted of tens of thousands of committed supporters. They came from bazaar merchants, shopkeepers, clerical networks, civil servants, and underground Islamic organizations. Many Iranian activists and clerics based in the United States and Europe returned to Iran and joined the effort. The success of the 1979 transition rested on execution as much as ideology. Power was seized and enforced by forces that already existed inside the country. Control was established immediately. This internal readiness, more than any external factor, explains why the transition held.

Afghanistan (2001–2021): A State Sustained from Outside

Afghanistan’s post 2001 transition was driven largely from outside the country. After the U.S. led intervention in late 2001, the Taliban regime collapsed quickly. A new political order was assembled through the Bonn Agreement with strong backing from the United States and its allies. Hamid Karzai was selected to lead the interim government and later became president through elections held under international supervision. From the beginning, core decisions on governance, security, and economic policy were shaped by foreign governments and international institutions. These decisions were implemented through centralized state structures with limited roots in Afghan society. Afghan participation existed, but authority depended heavily on external support. Large sums were committed to reconstruction and security. New institutions were created, including ministries, a national army, police forces, courts, and a new constitution influenced by Western models. On paper, the state appeared complete. In reality, it remained fragile. Most institutions relied on sustained foreign backing. International advisers were embedded across ministries. A significant share of the national budget came from donors. At its peak, more than 150,000 foreign troops were deployed to maintain security. Private contractors played a major role in logistics and training.

Early public optimism was real. Many Afghans welcomed the fall of the Taliban and hoped for stability. Over time, that optimism faded. Corruption spread. Services remained uneven. Insecurity persisted beyond major cities. Local power brokers filled the gaps where the state was weak. The economy remained aid dependent. Security forces relied on foreign air power, intelligence, and logistics. The system functioned only as long as external support remained in place. When that support was withdrawn in 2021, the state collapsed with remarkable speed. Provincial capitals fell quickly, and the government disintegrated within days. The outcome exposed a central flaw: a political order built from outside, without a self-sustaining domestic foundation, could not survive on its own.

Iraq (2003): A Transition Designed from Afar

The experience of Iraq offers a stark contrast to Iran’s 1979 transition. After Saddam Hussein was overthrown in April 2003, the United States and its allies established the Coalition Provisional Authority as the temporary governing body. The transition plan had been largely designed in Washington, D.C., before the invasion. It had limited grounding in Iraq’s political, social, and institutional realities.

The Coalition Provisional Authority was tasked with governing Iraq, rebuilding state institutions, and preparing the country for self-rule. Its earliest decisions proved decisive. The most consequential was de-Baathification. Tens of thousands of civil servants, teachers, engineers, and military officers were removed from public service. The policy was modeled on Germany’s denazification after World War II. Iraq’s context, however, was very different. In Iraq, Baath Party membership was often a condition of employment rather than a marker of ideological loyalty. The purge hollowed out the state at every level. At the same time, the Iraqi army and security services were dissolved. This decision created an immediate security vacuum. Looting spread across major cities. Government buildings were stripped. Borders were left largely unguarded. Law and order collapsed within weeks, despite the presence of more than 200,000 U.S. and coalition troops. The Coalition Provisional Authority, led by Paul Bremer, exercised full legislative, executive, and judicial authority. Iraq was governed through a foreign administrative structure supported by military forces and private contractors. Iraqi participation in decision-making was limited. There was no Iraqi authority with independent power capable of shaping or legitimizing the transition. Political bodies such as the Iraqi Governing Council were later formed. Their members were selected or approved by foreign administrators. Real authority remained external. Decisions continued to be made outside Iraqi society rather than through it.

In the early weeks after Saddam’s fall, public optimism was genuine. Many Iraqis welcomed the end of dictatorship and expected stability to follow. That optimism faded quickly. Insecurity became widespread. Economic hardship deepened. Political exclusion eroded trust. Armed resistance soon emerged. Sectarian militias formed. Regional actors exploited the vacuum, and foreign fighters crossed porous borders. Iraq descended into insurgency, sectarian conflict, and long-term institutional weakness that would last for years. Today, the Iraq intervention is widely regarded as a profound strategic failure. This view is shared not only by critics, but also by many U.S. officials who were directly involved. The core lesson is clear. A transition imposed from outside, without internal legitimacy or functioning institutions, cannot hold.

Libya (2011– Present): Regime Removal Without State Reconstruction

Libya offers a clear warning about externally driven regime change. In 2011, a U.S.-led NATO intervention was launched under a UN mandate to protect civilians during the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi. The military objective was achieved quickly. Gaddafi’s regime collapsed within months, and he was killed in October 2011. From a narrow military standpoint, the intervention succeeded. The political aftermath was not an oversight. It was shaped by intent. No sustained post conflict governing authority was created because there was no commitment to rebuilding Libya as a strong, independent state. There was no transitional administration, no unified security plan, and no domestic partner empowered to hold the country together. Western powers focused on eliminating Gaddafi, not on preserving or reconstructing the state he led. This approach was inseparable from opposition to Gaddafi’s political and economic vision. His system rejected Western models of governance and development. It was grounded in anti-imperialism, state control over strategic resources, and pan-African and Arab nationalist principles. Gaddafi promoted what he called the Third International Theory and used oil revenues to fund state-led programs such as free education, healthcare, and housing. The removal of Gaddafi was also the removal of this model. Replacing it with a coherent national alternative was never the priority.

Libya’s institutions had already been weakened by design. Power was centralized around Gaddafi, while the army and bureaucracy were deliberately fragmented to prevent internal coups. When the regime collapsed, national institutions could not absorb the shock. Weapons depots were looted. Militias refused to disarm. Local power centers emerged almost immediately. Initial public optimism was genuine. Many Libyans welcomed the end of authoritarian rule and expected political renewal. That moment was brief. Rival factions competed for territory, oil infrastructure, and legitimacy. Competing governments emerged, each backed by militias and foreign sponsors. Elections were attempted but failed to produce durable authority. The crisis deepened over time. Arms spread across borders into the Sahel. External powers intervened directly or through proxies. Libya became a theater for regional rivalry rather than a project of national recovery. Smuggling networks expanded, and human trafficking turned the country into a major transit route toward Europe. More than a decade later, Libya remains fragmented, unstable, and heavily militarized. The state never regained a monopoly on force. The central failure was not the removal of the old regime. It was the deliberate absence of a legitimate and sustainable political order rooted in domestic consensus and national sovereignty.

Syria (2011–2025): State Survival Through National Devastation

Syria illustrates a different, but equally destructive, outcome. In 2011, protests against the government of Bashar al-Assad escalated into armed conflict. What followed was not a single war, but a layered struggle involving domestic actors, regional powers, and global rivals. The United States and several allies pursued a strategy aimed at weakening and ultimately removing the Assad government. This approach relied on sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and support for selected opposition forces. Direct regime replacement, as seen elsewhere, was avoided. The objective was erosion rather than outright collapse. Unlike Iraq or Libya, the Syrian state did not disintegrate at its core. The regime retained control over key institutions, the regular army, and major urban centers. External backing from Russia and Iran proved decisive. Assad remained in power until 2025. In that sense, regime change failed. The country itself, however, was deeply damaged. Syria no longer functions as a fully sovereign state. Turkey maintains a permanent military presence across large parts of northern Syria through direct forces and proxy administrations operating outside Damascus’s control. Israel continues its occupation of the Golan Heights and enforces a de facto security buffer through repeated air and missile strikes inside Syrian territory. In the northeast, U.S. forces support Kurdish-led authorities that operate independently of the central government. Formal state institutions still exist, but effective national control is fragmented and constrained by foreign powers. Borders are porous. Airspace is contested. Key economic and security decisions are shaped externally.

The human cost has been immense. Hundreds of thousands have been killed. Millions have been displaced inside the country or forced into exile. Entire cities and towns were destroyed. The economy collapsed under war and sanctions, deepening poverty and social breakdown. Syria represents a distinct variation of the same underlying failure seen elsewhere. External intervention succeeded in producing crippling fragmentation, widespread devastation, and long-term national exhaustion.

Competing Visions and the Weight of History

These case studies should weigh heavily on current opposition thinking about Iran. One lesson stands out clearly. Khomeini did not prevail through foreign armies or externally designed plans. His movement succeeded because it was rooted inside the country and embedded in existing social and religious networks. Power was exercised locally, quickly, and with discipline. Outside decisions still mattered. In the final phase of the Shah’s rule, the United States withdrew political support and signaled that it viewed Khomeini as a tolerable alternative to a collapsing monarchy. This was not orchestration of the revolution, but it was a critical miscalculation. That shift weakened the Shah’s position and helped tilt the balance at a decisive moment. Washington did not control events, but its posture shaped the environment in which they unfolded.

The contrast with later interventions is stark. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and its allies failed despite overwhelming military force, trillions of dollars in spending, and the loss of thousands of lives. In Libya and Syria, they succeeded in removing or severely weakening governments, but at the cost of destroying the state itself. In every case, the societies left behind paid the price. Western policymakers have largely absorbed one conclusion. Nation buildings from afar does not work. Governments cannot be engineered in conference rooms or imposed by force. Any serious plan for Iran’s future must begin with this reality. Ignoring it risks repeating some of the most destructive failures of the modern era.

The most important lesson is structural. In every case, plans for toppling a government and shaping what follows are built, consciously or not, around the real strengths, weaknesses, and social reach of those doing the planning. Outcomes reflect who has genuine support on the ground and who does not. This is why any proposal must begin with a hard assessment of the opposition itself. Its credibility, organization and connection to society. U.S.-led strategies have tended to rely heavily on military force and economic sanctions. They have relied far less on broad local support. In many cases, that support was assumed rather than earned. The results have been durable regime removal without a durable political order. As difficult as it may be, removing a government may prove to be the easier task. The harder question is what comes next. How does a transition unfold without external domination, internal fragmentation, or institutional collapse? How are urgent economic and social needs addressed while political legitimacy is built?

Iranians across the spectrum, both inside Iran and abroad, share a deep desire for change. Views diverge sharply at this point. Some see the fall of the government as a single decisive moment, after which a new era will naturally emerge. Others see it as only one milestone in a long and demanding process that must continue well beyond regime change, through the slow construction of a democratic society. Today, two broad approaches are presented to Iranians. One is an unorthodox vision associated with Reza Pahlavi and monarchists. The other is a more traditional model advanced by groups referred to here as the “Resistance”. Both claim to offer a path forward. Both must be judged by the same criteria: internal presence, risk-sharing, organizational capacity, and the ability to govern once power is contested.

Reza Pahlavi and Monarchist Movement

Reza Pahlavi and his monarchist faction subscribe to a vision of change that is singular and decisive: a clean break. In practice, their strategy, consciously or not, equates to engineering a coup d’état. The approach hinges on the removal of the Islamic Republic’s leadership through any means necessary. This includes   encouraging military action by foreign powers, such as the U.S. and Israel, to decapitate the regime through assassination and bombardment. The resulting power vacuum would then be filled by an alliance with a pliable faction from within the existing system, paving the way for a new government with Pahlavi installed at its head.

The plan advanced by Pahlavi’s camp reflects its own strengths and weaknesses. Strategy follows capacity. The tools available shape the plan that is proposed. Approaches built from strength differ sharply from those formed under constraint. This perspective helps explain both the logic and the limits of the monarchist proposal. Reza Pahlavi and his supporters possess a distinct mix of external assets and internal vulnerabilities. These factors define their political posture and influence the strategy they promote. The strengths and weaknesses outlined below have shaped the monarchist approach, though the list is not exhaustive.

Strengths:

• Lineage: His royal name is a double-edged sword. It provides nostalgic appeal for some in Iran and more in the diaspora but is a liability for many inside Iran like Kurd, Azeris, Persian Arabs or Baloch who remember the previous Shah’s rule unfavorably.
• International Profile: He enjoys high name recognition abroad and has cultivated support from Israel, along with some sympathetic American and European politicians.
• Media Reach: He benefits from a well-funded, coordinated media network, including Farsi language TV and radio, financed by foreign governments and private interests.
• Propaganda apparatus– He has access to a foreign state linked online propaganda network. According to reporting by Le Figaro (French newspaper), this operation has created thousands of fake accounts. These accounts have generated more than 800,000 tweets and over 1.5 billion likes. The aim has been to amplify Reza Pahlavi’s visibility and inflate perceptions of his popularity. Such a tool can be further used to shape public opinion in his favor, especially among audiences outside Iran.
• Organization: He leads loyal diaspora circles, retains some support within Iran, and has demonstrated an ability to organize Iranians abroad.
• Freedom of Action: He can operate openly and lobby foreign governments directly without fear of reprisal from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
• Financial Resources- He can tap into financial resources provided by governments that are regional adversaries of Iran.
• Potential Backing: He could potentially benefit from covert intelligence or operational support from regional actors like Israel.

Ultimately, his greatest leverage may lie less in his own strength and more in the potent combination of his aspirations and the resources external actors are willing to invest in him.

Weaknesses:

• Disconnection: Having lived outside Iran for 47 years, he lacks an operational organization inside the country to mobilize people or execute plans.
• No Military Force: He commands no army or armed group within Iran.
• Lack of State Support: He does not have the backing of key governments, including the U.S. administration or the EU, which are reportedly pursuing other options.
• Narrow Domestic Base: His support is limited. Key ethnic groups, including Persian Arabs, Kurds, Azeris and Baloch have publicly rejected him, as have many popular Iranian political and social figures.
• Popular Distrust: Protest chants inside Iran, such as “Death to the oppressor, whether it be the Shah or the Leader,” underscore a significant segment of public opinion that rejects a return to monarchy.
• Leadership in Exile and Uncertain Commitment: The entire leadership circle behind monarchist initiatives, including the authors of Iran Prosperity Project, resides outside Iran. There is no clear indication that these figures are prepared to relocate to the country, risk their personal safety, or separate from their families. Nor is there any practical plan for their safe and secure return from the West. This raises serious questions about the feasibility of executing any transition plan from abroad.
• Political Isolation: No other major opposition group currently supports or is willing to cooperate with him.

Reza Pahlavi’s approach to toppling the Islamic Republic is shaped by his strengths and weaknesses. The strategy reflects what he possesses and what he lacks, and it exposes the gaps between image and reality. Pahlavi and the monarchist camp occupy a fragile position. Through a coordinated online propaganda effort, including bot-driven amplification and friendly foreign media coverage, they have cultivated the appearance of broad popularity, largely outside Iran. Inside the country, however, they lack meaningful organizational depth, operational capacity, and sustained grassroots presence. Independent monitoring and media analysis drawing on material cited by Haaretz, Citizen Lab, and other research groups indicate that his actual support inside Iran at best is limited to 17%, far from decisive. His proposed transition plan is quietly built around this weakness. It combines elements borrowed from two very different models: Iran in 1979 and Iraq in 2003. Structurally, it mirrors the Iraqi case. Instead of a Coalition Provisional Authority led by Paul Bremer, the plan envisions an interim governing body with Reza Pahlavi positioned as the final authority. Under this framework, he would approve key appointments and oversee the transition for 18 to 36 months. Power would be centralized, not delegated. At the same time, the plan selectively invokes Khomeini’s 1979 transition. Under the heading of military and bureaucratic engagement, it calls for encouraging members of Iran’s armed forces and security institutions to defect peacefully and preserve order. The assumption is that the existing state machinery can be reused rather than dismantled. In practice, this means relying on the same military and security apparatus that sustains the current system, merely under new leadership.

The plan was authored largely by academics and policy figures from the Iranian diaspora. It reads less like a serious transition blueprint and more like a generic academic exercise. Core assumptions are left unstated, even though the plan depends entirely on them. The document never clarifies whether Iran’s ethnic groups, political movements, and organized opposition accept Reza Pahlavi as interim leader or endorse his proposed transition. It does not address whether internal rivals would cooperate or resist. It also avoids external realities. There is no discussion of whether foreign military pressure would cease, whether sanctions would be lifted, or whether frozen Iranian assets would be released to finance governance. Any credible transition plan must begin with a clear and explicit list of assumptions. That foundation is missing. Without it, the proposal cannot be evaluated on practical grounds. The authorship itself raises further concerns. Few of the contributors appear to have held senior executive positions or managed large state institutions. The plan reflects limited engagement with the operational demands of governing a country of Iran’s size and complexity. Document closely resembles externally authored transition plans produced in Washington after 2003, except that the authors are Iranian expatriates rather than U.S. officials.

The central weakness remains unchanged. Regime change requires organization on the ground. Pahlavi does not have it. This explains his repeated appeals for direct external intervention. He has openly called on the United States and Israel to strike Iranian military facilities, cripple centers of power, and remove senior officials through targeted killings. The expectation is that such actions would fracture the state, force an internal split, and elevate him as a ready-made leader. This is not a strategy born of strength. It is a strategy born of absence. The logic is flawed. Any faction within the Islamic Republic inclined toward cooperation with the West does not need Reza Pahlavi to do so. It already has direct channels to Washington and European capitals. It is Pahlavi who needs such factions, not the reverse. There is no incentive for them to remove the system’s apex only to install an external figure with no domestic base.

Other constraints are routinely ignored. Most of Pahlavi’s active supporters have lived in Europe or the United States for decades. Few are prepared to return to Iran to face risk, administer ministries, or govern a country of over ninety million people. He also disregards the existence of organized political forces and ethnic constituencies that openly reject monarchy and oppose his leadership.

In the end, this plan is a direct product of Pahlavi’s limitations. Its execution depends on acceptance and participation by United States, Israel, and cooperating factions inside the Islamic Republic. Without them, it cannot move forward. With them, it risks repeating the same externally driven failures seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This raises an unavoidable question. Why has such a naively conceived plan been promoted so aggressively by foreign-funded Persian language television and radio networks? Why were thousands of Iranians pushed into violent confrontations with the state without protection, organization, or a credible path to power, confrontations that led to their deaths? The beneficiaries were not the Iranian people. Reza Pahlavi gained no lasting legitimacy. The regime emerged more isolated, yet more entrenched. The clearest gains went to Israel and other external actors whose interests lie not in Iran’s democratic transition, but in its prolonged instability and strategic weakening.

This leads to a more troubling question. Who is shaping the narrative within the monarchist camp? Is it truly Reza Pahlavi, or is the movement operating within a larger framework beyond his control? Who manages the messaging pushed by Persian language television and radio networks? Who coordinates the amplification through manufactured online narratives? Perhaps this alone warrants a closer examination. Not just of Reza Pahlavi’s role, but of the wider ecosystem that sustains him. That includes well-funded media outlets, coordinated messaging, fake accounts on X and Instagram, and the opaque sources financing the campaign. Only by examining this full picture can the scope of the political farce be understood. The task is left to the reader.

The Resistance Movement

The Resistance consists primarily of forces operating inside Iran, though it also receives support from outside the country. It is not a single organization, but a broad constellation of groups drawn from across society. Its members come from different ethnicities, social classes, professions, and age groups. The Resistance includes ethnic political groups such as Kurds, Azeris, Arab Iranians, and Baloch. It also includes professional and social organizations with long standing roots. These range from medical and professional associations to business networks such as the Bazaaris. Student organizations play an important role, as do labor groups and independent unions. Among them are the Syndicate of Workers of Tehran and Suburbs Bus Company, the Haft Tappeh Sugar Cane Workers’ Syndicate, and the Iran Free Workers’ Union. The Resistance also includes well known public figures and cultural voices, such as Narges Mohammadi and Toomaj Salehi. In addition, it includes thousands of political prisoners. Many of these prisoners are not passive victims, but organizers and leaders of ongoing movements. Members of the Resistance are deeply embedded in everyday life in Iran. They understand the internal workings of the state because they live under it. They are not directed or funded by foreign governments. Their struggle is shaped by local realities, not external agendas. Unlike much of the diaspora, these groups have a direct stake in both the present and future of Iran. They do not engage intermittently or from a distance. They see the removal of the Islamic Republic not as a single event, but as a long process already underway. This process has produced tangible results over time. Every major protest movement and uprising since 1979 has originated by the Resistance from within Iran. None has been initiated by actors based abroad.

Below is an outline of the strengths and weaknesses of the Resistance. This is not an exhaustive list.

Strengths

• Broad Social Base– The Resistance draws from a wide cross section of Iranian society. It includes labor syndicates, student organizations, underground political networks, and social and political figures from diverse backgrounds. This breadth gives it social depth rather than narrow appeal.
• Politicized Labor and Student Movements– Many labor and student groups are already radicalized. Their demands extend beyond wages or campus issues. They directly challenge the political system itself, not just its policies.
• Rejection of Personal Rule– The Resistance has moved beyond one-man leadership. This is reflected in the slogan, “Death to the oppressor, whether Shah or Leader.” Both clerical rule and monarchy are rejected as solutions. This marks a clear break from personality driven politics.
• Clear Separation Between Nation and Regime– The Resistance consistently distinguishes between Iran and the Islamic Republic. This was evident when it rejected Reza Pahlavi’s call for unrest during the twelve-day Israel war, viewing it as harmful to national interests rather than liberating.
• Leadership Rooted Inside Iran– Its leadership and core participants live inside the country. They operate where risks are real and consequences immediate. This lends credibility and ensures alignment with lived realities.
• Operational Adaptability– The Resistance has demonstrated an ability to organize, lead, and adapt in real time. It responds to changing conditions rather than relying on fixed scripts developed abroad.
• Existing Communication Networks– Channels of communication already exist among political groups inside Iran and through representatives abroad. These links allow coordination without centralized exposure.

Weaknesses

• Lack of Unified Strategy– The Resistance encompasses many viewpoints. As a result, it lacks a single message and a unified plan of action. Consensus is difficult to reach under pressure.
• Decentralized and Fragmented Operations– The movement operates in a chaotic environment. Many participants act independently, rely on improvised tactics, and follow no central command. This limits coordination and strategic coherence.
• Severe Repression and Surveillance– The Resistance functions under constant state surveillance. Arrest, imprisonment, torture, and execution are persistent threats. Every action carries personal risk.
• Constrained Leadership– Leaders cannot operate openly. Some are already imprisoned. Others remain underground. This restricts planning, communication, and continuity.
• High Cost of Mistakes– Tactical errors can be catastrophic. Misjudgments are often paid for in blood. There is little margin for error.
• Absence of Media Infrastructure-The Resistance lacks its own television or radio platforms. Its voice is often drowned out by well-funded, foreign backed Persian language media networks that shape narratives from abroad.
• Limited Financial Resources– Funding is scarce. The Resistance relies on personal contributions and informal support rather than sustained financial backing.
• Lack of Formal International Recognition– The movement has no official international representation. It operates largely outside formal diplomatic channels.
• Balancing Survival and Momentum– Survival requires constant caution. Preserving human capital is as critical as advancing the struggle. Growth must be weighed against the risk of irreversible loss.

The success of the Mahsa movement was achieved entirely from within Iran. One of its most visible outcomes was the government’s retreat from strict enforcement of the dress code, a central pillar of Islamic Republic control. The initial call for strikes and demonstrations came from Kurdish organizations after the killing of Mahsa Amini. From there, protests spread rapidly across the country. They crossed cities, regions, and ethnic lines. The movement reached Balochistan, where the massacre of demonstrators became seared into the collective memory of the Resistance. In its early phase, the Resistance was cohesive and internally driven. Demonstrations outside Iran followed events inside the country and served as acts of solidarity, not sources of leadership or direction. Fragmentation came later. It began only after Reza Pahlavi declared himself the leader of a movement he had neither organized nor controlled. That declaration introduced confusion at a critical moment. What had been a grounded and coordinated effort inside Iran was disrupted by an external claim to leadership that lacked legitimacy on the ground.

The Resistance has also repeatedly mobilized around economic demands that quickly became political. Retirees across Iran have held persistent and often weekly protests, including nationwide demonstrations in 2021, 2023, and January 2025. In May 2025, a nationwide truck drivers’ strike began and spread to more than 150 cities across all 31 provinces. It was organized by the Alliance of Iran Truckers and Truck Drivers’ Unions. These were not isolated incidents. They reflect a movement that is active, resilient, and deeply rooted. This maturity was also evident during the twelve-day Israeli war. Reza Pahlavi repeatedly called on people to take to the streets and topple the government. Those calls were ignored. People inside Iran refused to act. They understood the risks and carried long-term stakes in the country’s future. Unlike figures in the diaspora, they could not afford reckless escalation. More recently, after severe repression, the Resistance has not retreated. Following the January massacres, traders at Tehran’s Grand Bazaar called for nationwide gatherings to mark the fortieth day since protesters were killed. Members of the Iranian Ophthalmology Association publicly condemned the deliberate shooting of protesters in the eyes. They issued letters and petitions to officials. Similar acts of resistance continue across sectors. Despite mass arrests and killings, the movement persists because it views the struggle as its own.

The Resistance is not waiting for Israeli bombs or U.S. aircraft carriers. It is not pausing for negotiations with Khamenei. It does not look outward for salvation. Unlike monarchist figures, it does not take cues from Washington or Tel Aviv. It builds pressure from within

Toward a Coalition-Based National Alternative

Iran is a mosaic of regions with distinct ethnic, religious, and historical identities. Many of these regions are already represented by political organizations with established leadership and social legitimacy. In this context, the search for a single unifying strongman runs directly against popular will. After decades of monarchy followed by clerical rule, opposition to one-man authority is deeply ingrained. Rejection of personal rule, whether Shah or Supreme Leader, has defined modern Iranian political struggle. The natural next step is not another imposed leader, but an inclusive democratic system.

Iran’s political future is therefore more likely to emerge through broad coalitions or a national front model. This path follows a proven historical pattern. It mirrors the experience of Eastern Europe in 1989, where sustained protests, strikes, and political pressure produced systemic change. Poland’s Solidarity movement, Czechoslovakia’s Civic Forum, Hungary’s Opposition Round Table, East Germany’s New Forum, Bulgaria’s Union of Democratic Forces, and Romania’s National Salvation Front brought diverse political and social forces together under umbrella frameworks. These examples offer structure and method, not ideology or content.

Coordination among regional and ethnic organizations inside Iran is already underway. On January 8, 2026, seven Kurdish political organizations demonstrated their reach when businesses across Kurdistan shut down following a call for a general strike. Baluchi organizations remain deeply rooted in local communities. The same is true of Azeri groups. The central challenge now is coordination across these regions and greater Iran, rather than competition among them. At this stage, it would be logical for Resistance forces to move toward forming an Iranian Resistance Union (IRU). Its sole purpose would be to establish a broad coalition committed to an inclusive, secular, democratic government that treats all Iranians equally. Secure communication and coordination infrastructure could be developed with assistance from trusted representatives abroad. The goal would be to enable safe expansion, coordination, and collective action without imposing leadership from outside.

The IRU would then move to develop a long-term strategy built on sustained strikes, demonstrations, and coordinated pressure across regions and sectors. This would not be a short campaign. It would unfold over time, with patience and discipline. The goal would not be a dramatic moment, but steady erosion. Through sustained action, the IRU would grow stronger and more organized. Coordination would improve. Discipline would deepen. At the same time, the Islamic Republic would be forced to stretch its resources thin. Security forces would be deployed constantly, across multiple fronts. The state would become reactive rather than controlling. Its effectiveness would decline, and internal doubts would begin to surface. This would be a war of attrition. The pace and tempo would be set by the Resistance, not the state. Pressure would shift continuously across the country. One week the focus might be Tehran. The next, Mashhad. Then Tabriz, Ahvaz, or strikes by oil workers. No single city or sector would carry the burden alone. Over time, nearly every segment of Iran’s ninety million people would be engaged, directly or indirectly. No government, regardless of how repressive or well-armed, can sustain this level of nationwide pressure indefinitely. Constant mobilization drains morale, manpower, and legitimacy. It also forces the state to make mistakes. Each mistake accelerates the loss of control.

This strategy requires casting a wide net. The IRU would need to bring as many organizations, unions, professional groups, regional movements, and individuals under its umbrella as possible. Inclusion is not a slogan here. It is a necessity. The broader the coalition, the harder it becomes for the state to isolate, suppress, or destroy the movement.

Over time, the balance shifts. What begins as resistance gains weight and permanence. The image of state dominance starts to crack. Control becomes performative rather than real. Institutions strain. Ranks thin. The cost of repression rises, while its effectiveness declines. The system loses confidence, then cohesion, then footing. Collapse does not come from a single decisive blow. It comes when maintaining power costs more than surrendering it. At that point, the structure can be tipped over.

This pattern is well documented. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union did not fall because of a sudden uprising or foreign attack. It unraveled through sustained economic pressure, labor unrest, political stagnation, and the erosion of belief inside the system itself. By 1989, Eastern European governments still commanded armies and police forces, yet they no longer commanded consent or confidence. When mass protests spread and strikes paralyzed key sectors, the illusion of control shattered. Regimes that had appeared immovable collapsed with remarkable speed, not because they were struck harder, but because they had already been worn hollow from within. That is the logic of attrition. It is slow, uneven, and demanding. But history shows it is also decisive.

Below are preliminary examples of proposed IRU membership criteria. These should remain open to revision or rewrite:

• Commitment to a democratic government elected by the people and accountable to all citizens
• Commitment to overthrowing the Islamic Republic
• Exclusion of current or former senior officials of the Islamic Republic from membership
• Commitment to an independent Iran, free from both Eastern and Western domination
• Opposition to any foreign military attack on Iran
• Opposition to restoring monarchy as defined by Reza Pahlavi or the Iran Prosperity Project
• Prohibition of ties to, or financing from, foreign governments or interest groups
• Respect for the right of ethnic groups to elect their own representatives and preserve and practice their culture and traditions
• …

As outlined earlier, the Resistance already possesses significant strengths. The IRU would build on this foundation. Human infrastructure exists across the country. Local leaders are embedded in political organizations, unions, syndicates, professional associations, and community networks. In this sense, the movement already has a nationwide presence, much as Khomeini did through his organized networks in 1979.

Once the IRU is formed, a workable transition plan would be developed by those inside Iran. These are the people who would be responsible for carrying it out and living with its consequences. The plan would not be static. It would evolve as conditions change and as unforeseen challenges arise. It would be shaped by realities on the ground after the fall of the Islamic Republic, not by assumptions made abroad. State institutions would require reform, rehabilitation, and reconstitution. An IRU led interim government would oversee this process. Task forces would be created to draft a new constitution and prepare for national elections. Other teams would focus on security, border control, corruption, economic recovery, poverty, infrastructure, education and environment. These challenges are serious, but they are manageable when legitimacy comes from broad participation and internal consent.

The immediate priority is linkage. Resistance groups inside Iran must connect with one another. Where necessary, they should also link with trusted representatives abroad. This must be done without preselecting leaders or imposing hierarchy. Secure communication channels need to be established. A draft manifesto should be published. Short- and long-term goals must be clearly defined. Membership criteria should remain flexible, and invitations should be extended widely. As the IRU takes shape, it must also establish clear internal decision-making rules. A voting process will be required to reach majority consensus on core documents, strategic positions, and membership requirements. This process should be transparent, secure, and adaptable to operating conditions inside Iran. Consensus does not require unanimity. It requires legitimacy built through participation and clear rules.

Most IRU calls for strikes, demonstrations, and coordinated actions should be made openly. Transparency strengthens credibility and limits manipulation. At the same time, execution must remain decentralized. Management and coordination should be handled by local membership, based on regional conditions and capacity. Local actors are best positioned to judge timing, scale, and risk. Central coordination should guide overall strategy, not micromanage action. This balance between collective decision-making and local autonomy is essential. It prevents paralysis at the center and collapse at the edges. It also reinforces a core principle: the IRU is not a command structure imposed from above. It is a coalition governed by its members and accountable to them.

Overthrowing the government will be a war of attrition. It will require sustained regional, national, and sector-based strikes, protests, and coordinated pressure, along with targeted disruption. This pattern was visible in Eastern Europe in 1989 and, in part, in Iran in 1979. Unlike plans that rely on foreign bombs or alliances with regime factions, the IRU approach depends on Iranians who already oppose the system to shape their own future. Through this process, political maturity grows. Leaders emerge organically. Ownership of the future is claimed from within. Only then does society stop looking outward for salvation and begin to govern itself.

By : M. Davar
February 2026

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of IranOnline.com.

For a related exploration of these themes, you may also be interested in other article by M. Davar on this site: “Iran at a Crossroad: Liberation, Illusion, and the Cost of Foreign Salvation”