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VIII. "THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS"
While on the 18th only [Dr. Baghai's paper Shahed] had
published the imperial firman naming Zahedi as Prime Minis-
ter, on 19 August, as soon as the city was awake, early
risers could see photostats or type-set copies of the
firman in the papers Setareh Islam, Asia Javanan, Aram,
Mard-i-Asia, Mellat-i-Ma, and the Journal de Tehran. The
first four of these papers, and Shahed and Dad in addition,
ran an alleged interview with Zahedi which stressed that his
government was the only legal one in existence--an interview
that had been fabricated by [Djalili]. Somewhat later in the
morning the first of many thousand of broadsheets which carried
a photostatic copy of the firman and the text of the Zahedi
statement appeared in the streets. Although each of these
newspapers had a normal circulation of restricted size, the
news they carried was undoubtedly flashed through the city by
word of mouth, for before 0900 hours pro-Shah groups were
assembling in the bazaar area. Members of these groups had
not only made their personal choice between Mossadeq and the
Shah, but they were stirred up by the Tudeh activity of the
preceding day and were ready to move. They needed only
leadership.
Even before the day had dawned [Keyvani and Djalili]
having been informed that a pro-Shah statement by the
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ranking religous leader, Ayatollah Borujerdi, might be
forthcoming during the day, had made definite preparations
to utilize any such statement. [Djalili] and two of their
most enegetic sub-agents, [Mansur Afshar and Majidi] were
down at the bazaar section with a jeep and trucks ready
to set out for Qazvin. Their plan was to print broadsheets
at this town some 85 miles west of Tehran should it appear
that the Mossadeq government had increased its attempted
strangelhold on the urban press. As soon as they notice
that the pro-Shah groups were gathering, [Djalili, Majidi,]
[and Rezali, another sub-agent] rushed to supply the needed
leadership. [Djalili] accompanied one group in its progress
toward the Majlis, and on the way incited them to set fire
to the offices of Bakhtar-i-Emruz, the semi-official paper
owned by Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi, which on the
17th and 18th had printed most bitter and scurrilous attacks
on the person of the Shah. About the same time [Afshar] led
other elements toward the offices of the Tudeh papers
Shahbaz, Besuye Ayandeh, and Javanan-i-Democrat, all of
which were thoroughly sacked.
The news that something quite startling was happening
spread at great speed throughout the city. Just when it
reached Mossadeq, who was meeting with members of his
cabinet, is not known. By 0900 hours the station did have
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this news, and by 1000 hours word had come in that both
the Bakhtar-i-Emruz office and the headquarters of the
Iran Party had been ransacked. Also about 1000 hours
contact was established with the Rashidian brothers who
seemed full of glee. Their instructions, as well as orders
directed to [Keyvani and Djalili] were now to attempt to
swing security forces to the side of the demonstrators
and to encourage action for the capture of Radio Tehran. To
what extent the resulting activity stemmed from specific
efforts of all our agents will never be known, although
many more details of the excitement of the day may slowly
come to light.
Fairly early in the morning Colonel [Demavand] one of
those involved in the staff planning, appeared in the square
before the Majlis with a tank which he had secured from the
Second Battalion of the Second Armored Brigade, [a battalion]
[originally committed to the operation] Lt. Col.[Khosro-]
[Panah] and Captain [Ali Zand] were on hand and were joined
by two trucks from the same battalion, while members of
the disbanded Imperial Guard seized trucks and drove
through the streets. By 1015 hours there were pro-Shah
truckloads of military personnel at all the main squares.
While small groups had penetrated to the north of
the city by 0930 hours, the really large groups, armed
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with sticks and stones, came from south Tehran and merged
as they reached Sepah Square in their progress north toward
the center of the city. There the troops held in readiness
fired hundred of shots over the heads of the crowd, but
apparently were not willing to fire at these partisans of
the Shah. As a result the crowds were able to fan out
toward key points. Just up Lalezar, a main shopping street,
the Saadi theater, long sponsored by the Tudeh Party, ws
burned. The surging crowds of men, women, and children
were shouting, "Shah piruz ast," (The Shah is victorious).
Determined as thye seemed, a gay holiday atmosphere pre-
vailed, and it was if exterior pressures had been
released so that the true sentiments of the people showed
through. The crowds were not, as in earlier weeks, made
up of hoodlums, but included people of all classes--many
well dressed--led or encouraged by other civilians. Trucks
and busloads of cheering civilians streamed by and when,
about noon, five tanks and 20 truckloads of soldiers joined
it, the movement took on a somewhat different aspect. As
usual, word spread like lightning and in other parts of the
city pictures of the Shah were eagerly display. Cars went
by with headlights burning as a tangible indication of
loyalty to the ruler.
At about 1030 hours, General Riahi informed Mossadeq
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that he no longer controlled the army and asked for relief,
but Mossadeq visited his office and told him to hold firm.
Colonel Momtaz was able to assemble only one battalion
and disposed that force around Mossadeq's house.
About noon separate elements composing the crowds
began to receive direct leadership from the military and
police. Those army officers previously alerted to take
part in the military operations provided by TPAJAX were
now taking separate but proper individual action. By 1300
hours the central headquarters of the telegraph office on
Sepah Square had fallen into royalist hands. The AP man
filed a cable there shortly after 1300 hours giving a brief
report on the fighting. Then fighting moved a few hundred
yars away to the police headquarters and to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs building just across the wide avenue
from it. Defenders of the police station held out until
nearly 1600 hours.
Also about noon, Roosevelt went to the houses where
Generals Zahedi and [Guilanshah] were in hiding. They were
both fully informed of the events of the morning and told
to wait for instructions. An hour later Carroll and
Persian-speaking Major William R. Keyser (Assistant US
Military Attache) reported on the military situation. By
early afternoon more of the important objectives in the
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center of the city, such as the press and propaganda
offices, had been taken over by the royalists. With
important facilities under control, it was possible
to begin dispatch of streams of telegrams to the provinces
urging them to rise in support of the Shah. Even during
the greatest heat of the day there was no slacekening of
activity. Station agent [Djalili] was still on the streets
and, finding a crowd on Firdausi Avenue, urge them to go
to military police headquarters and demand the release of
Colonel [Nasiri] and General [Batmanlegich]. This they did.
The soldiers on guard put no resistance. Meanwhile
agent General [Nakhi (Qods Nakhai)] was touring the city in
his car attempting to round up members of the Imperial
Guard, soldiers who later took part in the attack on
Mossadeq's house. Early in the afternoon the crowds did
collect around approaches to Mossadeq's residence.
By this time he had probably already left.
Radio Tehran was a most important target, for its
capture not only sealed the success at the capital, but
was effective in bringing the provincial cities quickly
into line with the new government. During the heat of
activiy, it broadcast dull discussions of cotton prices,
and finally music only. Already at 1030 hours there had
been an inerruption of its schedule, but it was not until
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early afternoon that people began streaming up the borad
avenue toward their goal, some three miles to the north.
Buses and trucks bore full loads of civilians, army offi-
cers and policemen. Sheer weight of numbers seemed to
have overwhelmed the defenders of the radio station, and
after a brief struggle in which three deaths were reported,
at 1412 hours the station was in royalist hands. At 1420
hours it broadcast the first word of the success of the
royalist effort, including a reading of the firman. A
stream of eager speakers came to the microphone. Some
represented elements upon whom reliance had been placed
in TPAJAX planning, while others were quite unknown to the
station. Among the former elements were opposition papers
[Bakhtiar and Zelzeleh,] one of [Ayatollah Kashani's sons,] and
[likeh Etozadi.] Among spontaneous supporters of the
Shah to come to the microphone were Colonel Ali Pahlevan
and Major Husand Mirzadian; their presence was the proof--
no longer required--of the truth of the TPAJAX assumption
that the army would rally to the Shah under just such
circumstnces. For some period of time, Radio Tehran was
alternately on and off the air. It may have been finally
put into good operating condition by those engineers who,
as one speaker said, had come along for just such a purpose.
Here, as in so many other phases, chance served the cause
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very well, for, hd the original defenders of the radio
station managed to damage its facilities, the firm con-
trol of the capital might have been delayed.
At the Embassy, station personnel were following the
broadcasts of Radio Tehran, and were elated when it sudden-
ly fell into royalist hands. Once again Roosevelt set off
toward the hiding place of his valuable charges, meeting
them a little before 1600 hours. Told it was time for them
to play an active role, both promptly dressed for the
occasion. It was agreed that General Zahedi should meet
General [Guilanshah] at 1630 hours on a certain street corner
with a tank, and should proceed wih this vehicle to Radio
Tehran where Zahedi would speak to the nation. General
[Guilanshah] was taken from the house by Major [Keyser] in a
jeep; and then along the way, he spied two Air Force
officers, he asked to be let out, saying he would take
care of everything. Right on the street these officers
greeted him warmly and when he said he would like a tank,
they soon rounded one up. Asked if he knew where Zahedi
was, he said he did and that he had an appointment to
meet him at 1630 hours. His comrades pressured him to
make an immediate rendezvous with Zahedi, so he directed the
tank toward the compound in which the house sheltering
Zahedi was situated. Zahedi emerged and the tank set off
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again. At 1725 hours Zahedi spoke over Radio Tehran, and
this speech was repeated a little after 2100 hours that
evening.
Howevere, Zahedi had been preceded on the air by [sta-]
[tion agent Farzanegan.] In the dash back from [Karmenshah]
[Farzanegan's] car had broken down completely at about the
halfway mark, but he was able to get an uncomfortable ride
the rest of the way in an oil tank truck. He arrived in
Tehran by morning and contacted the station. At the latter's
urgent instructions, [Farzanegan] sent a telegram to Colonel
[Bakhtiar] which message contained a code phrase* signalling
[Bakhtiar] to lead his division on forced march to Tehran.
An interesting sidelight concerning [Bakhtiar's] march to
Tehran** occurred en route to Hamadan. The division entered
Hamadan just as the local Tudeh Party was holding a large
pro-Mossadeq demonstration. [Bakhtiar] quelled the demon-
stration in short order. The astonishment of the Tudeh
on seeing the [Kermanshah] division enter Hamadan was ex-
ceeded only by that of the town mayor.
Within Tehran proper the last nests of resistance were
being subdued. The Chief of Staff headquarters gave in at
_____________________
* "Am coming today to see my sick sister."
** The division actually arrived after Tehran was
already in Royalist hands.
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the end of the afternoon, and befofe 1900 hours Mossadeq's
house was taken and soon turned into a shambles. Its
belongings were dragged out into the street and sold to
passersby. Reactions were also being reported from the
provinces. At 1450 hours the regional station at Sanandaj
in Kurdestan suddenly went off the air. At 1555 hours
Radio Tabriz reported the capture of the station itself
by forces loyal to the Shah, and stated that ll of Azer-
baijan was in the hands of the army. As it continued
broadcasting, it became apparent that one of the speakers,
[Mohammad Deyhim, head of the Fedakaran-i-Azerbaijan] and
an effective sub-agent of station assets had played an
important role in events at Tabriz. By 1800 hours the
station at Isfahan was on the air with strong statements
in favor of the Shah and Zahedi by such elements as local
editors, a member of Baghai's Toiler's Party, religious
leaders, and staff officers--all groups which we had hoped
would react in this fashion. Not until 2000 hours did the
radio station at Kerman proclaim loyalty to the new govern-
ment. Meshed Radio was not heard from at all, but the
religious-minded town turned Loyalist almost immediately
after the news of the change had been sent out over Radio
Tehran. Known Tudehites were pursued and shops of Tudeh
sympathizers looted.
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Colonel [Farzanegan] following Zahedi's instruction,
and Carroll now closed up the operation. While [Batmangelich]
had [been named Chief of Staff, Farzanegan]--at that office--
kept in touch by phone and placed known supporters of
TPAJAX in command of all units of the Tehran garrison,
seized key military targets, and executed the arrest lists.
As the afternoon drew to its close, Radio Tehran seemed
to get down to a less haphazard schedule. From 1800 hours
on, it made short announcements of government appointees.
At 1845 hours the Associated Press representative and the
New York Times man made fairly brief statements on the
events of the day, intended for their home offices. Brief
government communiques dealt with curfew hours, contained
warnings against demonstrations, etc. A general news sum-
mary at 2100 hours was followed by a statement from Zahedi,
installed in the office of the Chief of Police, and before
2200 hours the station had signed off for the night. The
hectic day was over and curfew now in effect. Lives had
been lost, but not nearly as many as stated in the white
heat of the actual events. The security forces were
firmly in control and well prepared to destroy any counter-
effort.
How had other interested parties weathered the exciting
day? One such must have felt real anguish. This was the
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USSR and its people in Iran. Radio Moscow lagged far
behind the rest of the world and did not put out a sum-
mary of the day's events at Tehran until 2300 hours GMT.
Its Persian program that reach Iran early in the after-
noon was built around the text of the earlier Pravda
article entitled "The Failure of the American Adventure
in Iran," and this program was repeated early in the
evening. The same Pravda article was broadcast through-
out the late afternoon and early evening from Moscow in
English, Arabic, Bulgarian, Polish, Czech and Slovak, German,
Dutch, Italian, Portuguese, and Turkish, although by that
time nearly everyone of its listeners must have known that
this materila was no longer applicable.
The other parties to the original plan felt elated,
and possibly self-satisfied. While the reactions of
the Shah at Rome are rather beyond the scope of this account,
one or two of his remarks are worth citin as they bear
upon some of the original assumptions of the TPAJAX plan.
He said, "It was my people who have shown me that they were
faithful to the monarchy and that two and a half years of
false propaganda were not enough," and again, "My country
didn't want the Communists and therefore have been faithful
to me."
At Nicosia the earliest FBIS intercepts had not been
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translated and distributed until nearly mid-afternoon local
time. As word passed from Leavitt to Darbyshire, he latter
became so excited that he drove his friend right to his
]
office outside of the town, something he and his associates
had always avoided doing in earlier weeks.
Headquarters had its first word of what the day was
to bring just before 0900 hours when someone burst in from
the hall pouring out what at first seemed to be a bad joke--
in view of the depression that still hung on from the day
before--the news that Mossadeq was on the way out. Through-
out the morning, the afternoon, and until late that night
people hurried down the corridors with fresh slips of ticker
tape. During the entire day only two TPAJAX cables were
received from the station. However, it was a day that should
never have ended for it carried with it such a sense of ex-
citement, of satisfaction, and of jubilation that it is
doubtful whether any other can come up to it. Our trump card
had prevailed and the Shah was victorious.
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Section IX had no redactions.
Section X had one redaction: the names of Djalili and Keyvani
Appendices A, B, C and E had no redactions.
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