Redactions in this section could not be restored, shown as [ ];
supposed redactions shown by [ ] are based on restored redactions
of other sections -- Appendix D which described the events and
persons involved, with help from identities in Section VII.
S E C R E T
VI. THE FIRST TRY
The precise order of events of the night of 15 August
1953 has not yet been established in all detail. The early
accounts of various participants differed widely enough to
make it impossible to follow the slender thread of truth
through the dark night. However, the main outline of
this first try is clear, as are two basic facts connected
with it. These facts are: that the plan was betrayed by
the indiscretion of one of the Iranian Army officer partici-
pants--primarily because of the protracted delay--and that
it still might have succeeded in spite of this advance
warning had not most of the participants proved to be inept
or lacking in decision at the critical juncture.
Not until the evening of 14 August were Tehran Station
personnel informed that action had been postponed from that
night until the next one. Station principal agent Colonel
[Farzanegan] was not longer in touch with events and the
station was unable to guide General [Batmangelich], Zahedi's
Chief of Staff deisgnate--if, indeed, it was he who had
assumed the main responsibility.
According to a statement by Mossadeq's Chief of Staff,
General Tahi Riahi, he was informed of all the details of
the "plot" at five in the afternoon of 15 August. But
curiously enough--and according to his own account--he did
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nto elave his house in shimran, where National Frontists
Zirakzadeh and Haqshenas were staying, until 2000 hours and
then drove to staff headquarters in Tehran. Riahi did,
however, order the commander of the 1st Armored Brigade to
have the brigade ready at 2300 hours. At 2300 hours Riahi
sent his deputy, General Kiani, to the Bagh-i-Shah, the army
barracks on the western side of Tehran which included the
barracks of the Imperial Guard. Kiani was arrested there by
Colonel [Namiri] who had arrived at the Bagh-i-Shah sometime
earlier with several officers who supported him.
In the meantime a number of truckloads of pro-Shah
soldiers were making arrests. About 2330 hours they came
to Riahi's house in Shimran and, finding him out, arrested
Zirakzadeh and Haqshenas. Also about 2330 hours several
officers and a considerable body of soldiers rushed into
the home of Hoseyn Fatemi, Mossadeq's Foreign Minister,
and took him away before he had a chance to put on his
shoes. This meager haul of prisoners was driven to the
guard house of the Imperial Palace (Saadabad) at Shimran.
Officers who were aware that Riahi had been alerted
took no action, but others who were not, carried out their
tasks.
Sometime before 2330 hours a limited attack had been
made against the telepone system. Wires leading to the
house of Fatemi and to the houses of others who were to
be arrested were cut; the wires vetween GHQ (staff
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headquarters) and teh Bagh-i-Shah were cut; and Colonel
[ ] with a small armed force, occupied the telephone
exchange in the Tehran bazaar.
When Riahi did not hear from General Kiani, who had
gone to the Bagh-i-Shah, he (according to his own account)
phoned Colonel Momtaz of the 2nd Mountain Brigade and
Colonel Shahrokh of the 1st Armored Brigade and told them
to take their forces to the Bagh-i-Shah. At or before
this time he also alerted other officers, including Colonel
Parsa of the 1st Mountain Brigade; Colonel Ashrafi, the
Military Governor and Commanding Officer of the 3rd Mountain
Brigade; and Colonel Novzari of the 2nd Armored Brigade.
However, according to the accounts of Zahedi men engaged
in their operation, Momtaz and Shahrokh were arrested at
the Bagh-i-Shah and held there with Kiani for some time.
Government sources differ in their accounts as to what
happened when Colonel [Namiri] tried to deliver to Mossadeq
the Shah's firman dismissing him. According to General
Riahi, Colonel Momtaz was on his way to the Bagh-i-Shah
when he ran into Colonel [Namiri] in the street and there-
upon arrested him. According to the official communique
of the Mossadeq government, [Namiri] showed up before Mossadeq's
house at 0100 hours on 16 August with four trucks full of
soldiers, two jeeps, and an armored car. He claimed that
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he had a letter to deliver to Mossadeq, but was at once
arrested by the guards at the house of the Prime Minister.
Farzanegan [in clear] had still another version, claiming that [Namiri]
was arrested at 2350 hours at Mossadeq's house. After his
arrest, [Namiri] is alleged to have said that a delay of two
minutes in the arrival at Mossadeq's house of Lt. Colonel
[Zand-Karimi] with two truckloads of soldiers caused the
plan to fail.
It does seem fairly certain that Riahi had been able
before midnight to get detachments of soldiers to the
strategic points most likely to be attacked. Just what
incident or what reaction on the part of Riahi and others
loyal to Mossadeq caused the pro-Zahedi officers to falter
in their duties is not clearly known. It is known, however,
that Zahedi's Chief of Staff, General [Batmangelich], lsot
heart and went into hiding. This undoubtedly did much to
lower morale at the crucial time, as did the rapidly circu-
lated word of [Namiri's] arrest. Colonel [Farzanegan] went to
the Chief of Staff's office at 0100 hours on the 16th to
meet [Batmangelich] and it is known that General [Batmangelich]
did approach the GHQ with the intention of taking it over
but was frightened off when he saw tanks and troops in
readiness. He then rushed to Zahedi and told him to flee,
but Zahedi only laughed at him. Even the trucks with the
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prisoners had come down from Saadabad to the GHQ but, find-
ing it in hostile hands, retreated to Sasdabad. Those in
charge of the trucks released the prisoners at dawn.
Zahedi waited in vain for an escort to come and conduct him
to the Officers' Club. By about 0230 hours those Persians
who were still willing to carry out the operation were con-
vinced that the cause was lost, as they saw strengthened
detachments, more troops moving into the city, and vehicles
being stopped for questioning. [Farzanegan] and General
[Batmangelich] themselves, toured the town about 0230 hours;
then presumably separated, since [Batmangelich] was soon
picked up, while [Farzanegan] found sanctuary in station
hands. At the Embassy the station personnel had spent a
nerve-racking period of hours. The army radio-equipped
jeep called for in the plan failed to arrive at the compound,
and there was no way of knowing what was happening in the
city.
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