S E C R E T
APPENDIX D
Report on
Military Planning Aspect
of TPAJAX
S E C R E T
Military Aspects Operation TPAJAX
In early summer 1953 Carroll was assigned the task of
planning military aspects of TPAJAX. Several assumptions
first had to be taken into account:
A. Operation would be joint operation with SIS.
B. Operation would rely heavily upon military
willingness to fight for Shah.
C. Armed forces in Iran under Mossadeq very strongly
led by pro-Mossadeq officers.
D. Operational assets within armed forces controlled
by SIS o CIA were not at the outset capable of
executing the military objectives of TPAJAX.
Planning tasks which had to be accomplished:
E. Detailed study of the leading military personali-
ties in Iran.
F. Detailed study of order of battle of the Iranian
Army with emphasis on the Tehran garrison.
G. Detailed military study of communications, supply
dumps, ammunition depots, command structure Iranian
armed forces, time and distance factors within
Tehran and throughout Iran, including road and
rail nets.
H. Detailed study military assets possessed by SIS.
I. Operational assets to be developed by CIA; almost
no military assets were then under CIA control.
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George Carroll in Washington began a staff study pre-
liminary to drafting a military plan. Persons who were
particularly helpful in the preparation of this study were
Jerome F. Begert, Willima Fowlkes, Jr., Eugene E. Cilsdorf,
Elizabeth E. McNeill, Betty J. Caldwell, and Arthur W.
Dubois. This group constituted a branch task force.
Throughout the summer cables were exchanged with the
Tehran Station in an effort to procure the latest informa-
tion on the order of battle of Iranian armed forces. The
Iranian desk, G-2, Pentagon, was queried in an effort to
obtain whatever information they could get which might help
accomplish the above tasks. Information available in G-2
was almost non-existent. Biographical information on
leading Army figures was extremely scanty. G-2 did not
possess a tactical map showing the military situation in
the city of Tehran. It must also be admitted that CIA
too was unprepared for this type of operational plan and
a heavy burden had to be laid upon the field at a time
when the Tehran Station was already occupied with the
opening phases of TPAJAX.
The primary difficulty in staff planning at this time
was the fact that neither the field nor headquarters pos-
sessed detailed information on military figures in Iran.
CIA had heretofore never placed particular emphasis on
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that type of operational reporting, and we learned as
the days went by how extremely important, indeed vital,
that type of reporting is.
Throughout the month of June, the branch task force
gradually was supplied information from the field which
made it possible to begin thinking about the use of the
forces within the Tehran garrison. The field reported
that Tehran was garrisoned by five brigades, three infan-
try mountain brigades, and two armored brigades. In
addition, four other military forces existed: the Gen-
darmerie, the police, the armed customs guard, and the
forces under the military governor. It was also learned
that the young Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Taghi
Riahi, and his staff had been drawn primarily from members
of the pro-Mossadeq Iran Party. It had to be assumed that
the chief of staff and officers within all sections of his
staff were under control of Mossadeq. I has also to be
assumed that at least three out of five of the brigade
commanders in Tehran were completely under General Riahi's
control. Those assumptions proved to be correct. SIS
reported that Colonel [Ashrafi, military governor of Tehran
and commanding officer of the Third Mountain Brigade,] could
be relied upon; this later turned out to be incorrect but
for staff planning purposes in June it had to be assumed
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correct. It was disappointing to learn that Major General
Zahedi, Prime Minister designate under TPAJAX, possessed
almost no military assets. General Zahedi, therefore,
could not be relied upon to execute his own staff plan.
In the early part of July, the branch task force was
able to draw up a plan designed to neutralize the Tehran
garrison and to isolate all other brigades in Iran. It
appeared at that time that only a very small force could
be relied upon by CIA, primarily the Thrid Mountain Brigade
in Tehran. Therefore, our first staff plan was based upon
the use of the Third Mountain Brigade for the capture and
arrest of the officers assigned to the Chief of Staff, as
well as the arrest and neutralization of all other forces
in the city of Tehran.
Because of the fact that CIA did not possess any mili-
tary assets capable at that time of helping TPAJAX, it was
suggested that Station agent Colonel [Aban Farzanegan] be
given special training. [Farzanegan] was trained in a safe-
house in Washington with the assistance of instructors from
the training division. [Farzanegan] had no idea what lay
before him. He had never previously participated in any
military action, although he had been superbly trained [in]
[logistics in the Command and General Staff School at Ft.]
[Leavenworth. Further, he had been assistant military]
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[attache for Iran in Washington for several years, and]
before that had been the [Iranian liaison officer to the
[United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Tehran.]
[He, therefore, had a good grasp of American army methods.]
[He was a Signal Corps officer by profession.] Because of
the extreme sensitivity of TPAJAX, [Farzanegan] was given
the lie detector test. In early July, [Farzanegan] was
directed to go to Tehran and to renew all of his old
contacts within the Iranian Army.
In June, Carroll was assigned TDY to Cyprus to work
with Donald Wilber, NEA Planning Officer, and SIS. Carroll
concentrated on military planning aspects with SIS, and
ascertained the extent to which SIS could control Iran
military assets. Headquarters was extremely concerned
because the plan assumed that the Shah would sign a firman
dismissing Mossadeq without being certain that his Army
officers and men were well organized enough to force
Mossadeq from office in the event Mossadeq did not obey
the firman, since CIA and SIS did not possess military
assets capable of being organized into an effective fight-
ing force and it was feared that the development of new
military assets adn their organization into a fighting
force could not be accomplishe in time.
SIS in Cyprus stated that it did have several important
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friends among the military, but the only officer among their
friends then in a position to be of assistance to us was
Colonel [Ashrafi.] SIS agreed that our preliminary military
plan must be based on the assumption that Colonel [Ashrafi]
would cooperate. Military Planner Carroll doubted whether
one brigade out of five would be sufficient to overthrow
Mossadeq and stated frankly that our military plan must be
viewed as extremely tentative; he also stated that he hoped
upon arrival in Tehran to find other assets in addition to
Colonel [Ashrafi.] From the military point of view the dis-
cussions in Cyprus were extremely disappointing because they
made it clear that we wanted to accomplish much but had very
little with which to accomplish it. It also made it clear
that Carroll and Colonel [Farzanegan] should arrive in Tehran
as soon as possible where the military plan would be neces-
sity have to be completed.
On 15 July Carroll left for London where SIS studied
the military plan for two days and approved it with little
comment. They agreed that, if TPAJAX were to succeed, CIA
must start from scratch adn work quickly to find powerful
friends among Iranian Army troop commanders. In London,
Carroll with Major Keen and two other British Army officers
on duty with SIS, went over two military plans which had
been drawn by the branch task force.
Both of our military plans used the same arrest lists
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for military and civilian persons in Tehran. These lists
were compiled as a result of a long study of pro-Mossadeq
Iranians, and later proved to be at least 90 percent cor-
rect. The British approved the arrest lists after their CE
expert and their biographical section studied them. A
third arrest list, the Tudeh Arrest List, was studied very
carefully by SIS Tudeh Party experts and was approved with-
out addition. It would seem that our appraisal of Iranians
must have been based upon approximately the same information.
While these arrest lists were farmed out to SIS ex-
perts Carroll sat down to study the two military plans
with Major Keen and with the British major. The first plan
was based upon the assumption that [Colonel Ashrafi] was a con-
trolled British agent [and that his Third Mountain Brigade would]
[follow his commands.] After a detailed examination of the
Target List for Neutralization In the City of Tehran (machine
gun factory, Ministry of Post and Telegraph, Office of the
Chief of Staff, etc.), SIS stated that the targets we had
listed for neutralization were the correct ones and that we
had assigned duties for components of the Third Mountain
Brigade about as well as any other way they might suggest.
We next turned to an examination of our second military
plan based upon the assumption that Carroll might be able
to develop assets in Tehran capable of controlling three
bridgades. We all agreed that it would be extremely
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hazardous to base all of our hopes upon one brigade out
of the five in Tehran and that, if possible, we should
attempt to develop additional forces. SIS approved this
plan and they then passed both plans up to a brigadier
who returned them next day without comment.
During these discussions a cable arrived in London
via Cryprus from Tehran in which Tehran Station reported
General Zahedi's "military assets." This message con-
firmed all of our fears. For some time the Station had
been attempting to persuade General Zahedi to list his
military assets and to indicate how he hope to use them.
At last General Zahedi reported. He claimed none of the
five brigades in Tehran. His military plan assumed that he
might be able to use the Imperial Guard, some troops from
the Department of Army Transport, components from the De-
partment of Police, and components of the Armed Customs
Guard. He also hoped that Colonel [Timur Bakhtiar] might
be able to bring troops to Tehran from [Kermanshah.] SIS
asked Carroll to write for them an appreciation of Zahedi's
plan. In that appraisal it was stated that he did not
believe the Shah would sign a firman dismissing Mossadeq
until Zahedi could indicate to him how Chief of Staff
Riahi's control over the Tehran garrison could be broken;
further, he felt that if TPAJAX were to succeed military
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assests must be developed within the five brigades in
Tehran.
SIS agreed in London that military tasks should take
the following priority:
1. Seizure and occupation of designated points.
2. Execution of arrest and detention lists.
3. Neutralization of pro-Mossadeq military
forces in Tehran.
4. Neutralization of the city of Tehran.
5. Reinforcement of pro-Zahedi forces in
Tehran by forces outside of the city.
These priorities were laid down because it was desired
that communications be knocked out as soon as possible in
order to prevent pro-Mossadeq forces and personnel from
communicating with each other.
Carroll left London on the first available aricraft
following these conferences, arrived in Tehran on 21 July,
and got in touch with [Farzanegan.]
Sifting through [Farzanegan's] operational contact
reports covering all of his important conversations in
Tehran [after his arrival from the United States], two offi-
cers were noted as being of especial promise. These were
contact reports of conversations with Major General [Nadr
[Batmangelich] and with Colonel [Hassan Akhavi], both of whom
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were old and good friends of [Farzanegan]. These two officers
reflected the fear of the Tudeh party that was becoming gen-
eral after the Tudeh showing of 21 July. Goiran, Goodwin, and
Carroll agreed that it was imperative that Carroll meet as
soon as possible with an officer appointed by Zahedi to work
on our military scheme. Zahedi never did designate a military
secretariat, and it was necessary for us to develop our own.
Because of General Zahedi's manifestly weak position
among the military then on active duty, and because it be-
came apparent that it would be necessary for CIA to seize
the initiative and to furnish him with a military plan and
military forces, the development of Colonel [Akhavi] was
stepped up. [Farzanegan] was directed to determine what
assets Colonel [Akhavi] might be able to lead us to. Colonel
[Akhavi] first offered a "Plan A" which called for a military
coup d'etat without explaining how it was to be accomplished.
Then [Farzanegan] was pressed to persuade Colonel [Akhavi] to be
more realistic, and on 30 July he received from Colonel
[Akhavi] a plan which was more specific but still pitifully
inadequate. Colonel [Akhavi] said he would execute arrests
and target lists, neutralize military installations and
non-cooperating forces within two hours; this was nonsense.
The most important thing Colonel [Akhavi] reported was that
he was in touch with three young colonels who might possess
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important strength within the Tehran garrison. Colonel
[Akhavi] also told [Farzanegan] that General [Batmangelich]
lacked courage but would stiffen his back should the
Shah appoint him Chief of Staff. Colonel [Akhavi] did not
mention General Zahedi and did not seem to be in touch
with him. [Farzanegan] told Colonel Akhavi that he could
put Colonel [Akhavi] in touch with one or two Americans whom
he had met in the United States.
At this time the Shah also indicated that he did not
have control of important military assets.
Carroll met [Akhavi] and [Farzanegan] on 2 and 3 August and
begam [sic] staff planning. Colonel [Akhavi] was full of desire to
do something, but had no idea of how to go about it. He
said that he had friends who could control the Second and
Third Mountain Brigades but did not trust either Colonel
[Ashrafi], Commanding Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade
[and an alleged SIS asset], or Colonel Momtaz, Commanding
Officer of the Second Mountain Brigade. Colonel [Akhavi]
reported that General [Batmangelich] had told him the day
before that if the Shah acted he was ready to perform any
service whatsoever and to die for the Shah if necessary.
After these early meetings with Colonel [Akhavi], it became
apparent that he, himself, was not in a position to command
anything and was only hoping that he might persuade his
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friends to do so.
Carroll then met directly with Colonel [Akhavi] and
his friend. The latter turned out to be Colonel [Zand-Karimi],
[Colonel Komtaz's deputy]. Colonel [Zand-Karimi] reported a
long list of assets within the Tehran garrison, principally
among deputy commanders of brigades and regimental com-
manders. On 6, 7, and 8 August, Colonels [Akhavi, Zand-
Karimi, Farzanegan], and Mr. Carroll carried on staff plan-
ning based upon the units commanded by friends whom [Zand-
Karimi] claimed. Colonel [Zand-Karimi] stated that his primary
friends were [Colonel Hamidi], of the Tehran police; [Colonel]
[Ordubadi], of the Tehran Gendarmerie District; and [Colonel]
[Mansurpur, Commanding Officer Iranian Cavalry]. He felt
certain that ultimate victory would be ours through these
friends, and through his friends who were regimental and
battalion commanders, among these were important unit
commanders in the Tehran garrison: [Colonel Rohani, Deputy]
[Commander of the Third Mountain Brigade; Lt. Colonel Khosro-]
[Panah, Commanding Officer of the Second Mountain Brigade]
[Infantry Regiment; Lt. Colonel Yusefi, who was soon to be
named Commanding Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade's
Infantry Regiment.] Through these officers Colonel [Zand-
[Karimi] was in touch with every infantry battalion commander
in Tehran and with most of the company commanders; however,
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those officers had not been formed into an organization
and were not ready to overthrow Chief of Staff General
Riahi's firm control of the Terhran garrison which he ex-
ercized through the Brigade Commanders in Tehran. For
instance, if we were to succeed we must arrest Colonel
Sharokh, Commanding Officer First Armored Brigade; Colonel
Parsa, Commanding Officer First Mountain Brigade; and
probably Colonel Ashrafi, Military Governor and Commanding
Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade. Colonel Novzari,
Commanding Officer of the Second Armore Brigade would
probably remain neutral but we felt it imperative that his
deputy, Lt. Colonel Bahrami, be arrested.
It therefore became clear from the military point of
view that success might depend upon whether or not General
Riahi succeeded in arresting our friends before we arrested
his, and that the test of strength would very largely rest
upon the amount of security we were able to maintain while
attempting to knit all of our friends into a functioning
team.
It also was clear that we had to devise a scheme capable
of carrying our operations in the event our first platoon
of young officers was arrested. Carroll therefore worked
for two nights with Colonels [Farzanegan and Zand-Karimi]
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devising a system which would work in the event our first
team was arrested. The danger signal we adopted to alert
battalion and company commanders to take independent action
was the arrest of Colonel [Zand-Karimi] and of his closest
friends. The weakness in our plan lay in the fact that the
station would not be in a position to contact battalion and
company commanders but would have to depend upon Colonel
[Zand-Karimi] to do the job. While discussing this subject,
Colonel [Zand-Karimi] stated that he would be able to contact
lower unit commanders within 48 hours after receipt of the
Shah's firman.
The hesitation of the Shah in signing the firman worked
to our advantage for it gave us several more important days
in which to discuss with Colonel [Zand-Karimi] the development
of our final staff plans which was based upon the use of the
units which his friends commanded. This problem was compli-
cated by the fact that Colonel [Akhavi] became violently ill
and was later forced to retire to his bed. As the climax
approached, tension increased and it is not inconceivable
that tension caused by fear had something to do with Colonel
[Akhavi's] illness. Colonel [Akhavi] did remain on his feet
long enough to speak to the Shah on 9 August in an interview
which later proved vital to the success of the military phase
of TPAJAX. Until Colonel [Akhavi] saw the Shah, he was not
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certain that our friends in the Tehran garrison would act
without the Shah's approval. However, after talking with
the Shah, Colonel [Akhavi] was able to tell Colonel [Zand-
Karimi] that the Shah did desire military support in the
event he should decide to sign the firman.
Colonel [Akhavi] was asked by the Shah whether or not
the Army would back a firman dismissing Mossadeq. Colonel
[Akhavi] told the Shah that he had been meeting with Carroll
and that a reasonable staff plan was being prepared, one
that assured victory if it were carried out properly. The
Shah then asked [Akhavi] for the names of the officers who
would cooperate, and Colonel [Akhavi] reported the same names
which we had earlier submitted to the Shah through Asadollah
Rashidian. He asked [Akhavi] to meet General Zahedi.
In reporting the substance of his audience with the
Shah, Colonel [Akhavi] asked the station if the United States
would support General Zahedi. He was told that it would.
Colonel [Zand-Karimi] also accepted General Zahedi. Both
officers stated that they had not been in touch with General
Zahedi for several months but believed him to be a very good
leader.
During the nights of 11, 12 and 13 August, staff plan-
ning continued based upon the use of forty line commanders
within the Tehran garrison. Colonel [Akhavi] met General
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Zahedi who agreed that General [Batmangelich] might be chief
of staff. General [Batmangelich] expressed the desire to
meet Carroll and to discuss plans with him, Farzanegan [in clear],
Colonel [Akhavi], and Colonel [Zand-Karimi]. This meeting
was postponed until we felt our staff plan was complete
enough for General [Batmangelich] to act upon it.
On 11 August Zahedi asked [Akhavi] to have [Farzanegan]
come to see him. General Zahedi and [Farzanegan] talked
for three hours. [Farzanegan] reported that General Zahedi
was extremely appreciative of American assistance and
asked [Farzanegan] to act as liaison officer between him-
self and the Americans for military purposes; he also asked
him to become his officer in charge of the Military Bureau
which had been meeting with Carroll during the last week.
On 12 August Farzanegan [in clear] took General [Batmangelich] to
see Zahedi, and General [Bamangelich] pledged General Zahedi
all assistance. [Farzanegan] also took Colonel [Zand-Karmini]
to see Zahedi and the latter reported to General Zahedi
progress of military staff planning. In retrospect it
would appear that under more favorable conditions we should
have spen more time going over the staff plan with Zahedi
and General [Batmangelich], for it was at this moment that
the military phase of TPAJAX passed into Zahedi's hands,
although Zahedi did not know any of the young officers
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involved and General [Batmangelich] knew only a few of them.
During the afternoon of 15 August, Carroll met with
General [Batmangelich] and the Military Secretariat composed
of [Farzanegan,] Colonel [Akhavi,] and Colonel [Zand-Karimi].
The firmans were expected momentarily and much of the
conversation revolved around the question of how long it
would take Colonel [Zand-Karimi] to contact our friendly
forty line commanders. After a long discussion everyone
agreed action should commence within 48 hours of the re-
ceipt of the firmans. It was also agreed that Colonel
[Namiri, Commanding Officer of the Imperial Guard], would
deliver the firmans to Mossadeq after he had sent the
station a radio set attuned to Colonel [Zand-Karimi's]
command net.
Colonel [Namiri] flew to Ramsar with the unsigned
firmans on 13 August.
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