Redactions in this section could not be restored, shown as [ ];
supposed redactions shown by [ ] are based on restored redactions
of other sections -- Appendix D which described the events and
persons involved, with help from identities in Section VII.
S E C R E T
V. MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHAH
From the very beginning it had been recognized that
the Shah must be forced to play a specific role, however
reluctant he might prove to be. Therefor, the plan pre-
sented a series of measures designed to rid him once and
for all of his pathological fear of the "hidden hand" of
the British, and to assure him that the United States and
the United Kingdom would firmly support him and had both
resolved that Mossadeq must go. The measures were also
intended to produce such pressure on the Shah that it would
be easier for him to sign the papers required of him than
it would be to refuse.
On 23 June the timetable covering all the envoys to
be sent to the Shah was drawn up at Headquarters. In
execution all these steps went off as planned.
The initial task was to brief Princess Ashraf, who was
thought to be in Paris at that time. It was planned to
approach her about 10 July in Paris and have her back in
Tehran to see the Shah about 20 July. Asodollah Rashidian,
still in Geneva, was to call upon her first and prepare her
for the joint visit of Darbyshire for SIS and Meade for CIA.
(SIS had assured Headquarters that this call could be made
in Paris at any time.) Meade arrived in London by air on
22
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
10 July and went at once to Paris with Darbyshire. Then
an unanticiapted delay occurred. Princess Ashraf was not
in Paris, and it was not until the 15th that she was lo-
cated on the Riviera and visited by Asodollah Rashidian.
He reported that she had shown no enthusiasm at all with
regard to her proposed role. However, the next day the
"official" representatives had two meetings with here and
she agreed to do everything that was asked of her. She
did say that her arrival would arouse a strong reaction
from the pro-Mossadeq press and hoped that we would be
able to put out effective counterblasts. Meade reported
in London to Roosevelt and Leavitt. He then returned to
Paris and stayed close to Ashraf until her departure for
Iran.*
Ashraf reach Tehran as a passenger on a commercial
flight on 25 July. As expected, her unauthorized return
did create a real storm. Neither the Shah, himself, nor
the government of Mossadeq had been asked to permit her to
return. Both were furious. The Shah refused to see her
but did accept a letter passed on through the medium of
[Soleiman Behbudi], ** head of the Shah's household, who was
_________________________
* Meade's character studh of Ashraf is in the TPAJAX file.
**SIS agent within the palace. [See identity in Section 7.]
23
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
loyal and devoted in an effective way throughout this
period. This letter contained news that US General
Schwarzkopf was coming to see the Shah on an errand simi-
lar to that of Ashraf, herself. The Shah welcomed this
news and received his sister on the evening of 29 July.
The session opened stormily but ended on a note of recon-
ciliation. On the next day she took a plane back to
Europe. This was as had been planned, but it came as a
relief to know that she was out of the country in view of
the pro-Mossadeq press reaction.
The second emissary arrived on the scene in the per-
son of Asadollah Rashidian, the principal SIS agent. Accord-
ing to the plan, Asadollah Rashidian's initial task with
the Shah was to convince the ruler that Rashidian was the
official spokesman of the UK Government. The advance plan,
that of having the Shah select a key phrase which would
then be broadcast on the British Broadcasting Company (BBC)
Persian language program on certain dates, was followed.
In London the necessary arrangements had been made by
Darbyshire to send the phrase over the BBC. On 30 July
and again on the 31st the Shah saw Asadollah Rashidian.
He had heard the broadcast, but he requested time to assess
the situation. Asadollah was, however, able to prepare the
Shah for the visit of the American emissary, General
24
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
Schwarzkopf, and to stress the point that this emissary
would repeat the message and, hence, give an additional
guarantee of the close collaboration between the United
Kingdom and the United States in this undertaking.
Schwarzkopf had been chosen by the drafters of the
operational plan because of the fact that he had enjoyed
the friendship and respect of the Shah in the period from
1942 until 1948 when he headed the US MIlitary Mission to
the Iranian Gendarmerie. Approached on 26 June 1953 by
John Waller, Chief, NEA/4, briefed at Headquarters on
19 July, Schwarzkopf took to his mission with relish. He
said that he had a reputation with the Shah for telling
him unpleasant truths that others withheld from him, and
he stated that he was sure he could get the required coop-
eration from the Shah. Schwarzkopf was given a cover mis-
sion consisting of a short tour to Lebanon, Pakistan, and
Egypt so that his visit to Tehran would appear as a brief
stop en route to a principal destination. Schwarzkopf left
by air for Beirut on 21 July.
Schwarzkopf's mission was to obtain from the Shah the
three papers which are described more fully in the opera-
tional plan. They were: (1) a firman naming Zahedi as
Chief of Staff, (2) a letter indicating his faith in
Zahedi which the latter could employ to recruit army
25
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
officers for the plan in the name of the Shah, and
(3) a firman calling on all ranks of the army to support
his legal Chief of Staff. It was felt that it would be
easier to get the Shah to sign such statements than to
issure a firman dismissing Mossadeq. It was also believed
that the action of replacing Mossadeq would be initiated
through the Majlis.
Certain events of 21 July at Tehran both shocked and
aroused from thier attitude of complacency the more con-
servative elements which had firmly supported Mossadeq.
Demonstrations marked the anniversary of rioting against
the government of Qavam and of efforts made at that time,
two years earlier, to settle the oil issue. However, it
was obvious to all that the number of Tudeh participants
far outnumbered those assembled by the Naitional Front, and
it was this fact more than anything else which alerted the
thinking public to the strength acquired by the Tudeh under
the Mossadeq government. At this time station personnel
were active on several fronts. The propaganda campaign
against Mossadeq was now gaining momentum. [ ]
owner of [ ] was
granted a personal loan of some $45,000 on signed notes
in the belief that this would make his organ amenable to
our purposes. Headqurters-prepared propaganda material
26
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
was turned over by the station to Asadollah Rashidian,
and by the end of the month an entirely separate and
especially planned campaign in favor of the Shah as opposed
to Mossadeq was under way in Azerbaijan. The parallel and
alternative plan of keeping in close touch with the [ ]
[ ] combination for the purposes of diverting their
attention from TPAJAX and of discovering the plans and
strength of this group remained in effect. Talks with
the [ ] continued. At one point the station suggested
sending one of the brothers to this country, and Headquarters
made an immediate investigation of the mechanics required
for making such a trip. The SIS was informed of these
talks, and they suggested that their facilities might be
used to stir up tribal revolts in the homeland of the
[ ].
The station was now in direct contact with Zahedi,
who had left his sanctuary in the Majlis on 21 July.
After several meetings Station Chief Goiran and Station
Chief Designate Goodwin reported that Zahedi appeared
lacking in drive, energy, and concrete plans. They con-
cluded that he must be closely guided and that the neces-
sary plans must be made for him.
By 26 July a number of key individuals had moved into
position: Roosevelt and Schwarzkopf were at Tehran,
27
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
Leavitt had been at Nicosia for several days, and
Ambassador henerson had come to rest at Salzburg, where
he was to remain, anxious but cooperative, for the next
two weeks. At Nicosia, Leavitt did a most capable job of
reassuring SIS officials who frequently felt that they
were not receiving enough current information. Concomi-
tantly, these SIS officials passed on valuable suggestions
coming from London, such as detailed plans for putting the
central telephone exchange out of operation.
With Roosevelt's arrival in Tehran the situation was
restudied. As a part of the war of nerves against Mossadeq,
it was considered advisable to cut down close contacts be-
tween high-ranking US officilas and officials of Mossadeq's
government. Technical Cooperation in Iran (TCI) Director
William E. Warne was requested to reduce his normal govern-
ment contacts, and General Frank McClure, Chief of the US
Military Mission in Iran, was requested to appear less
friendly with those general officers who were firmly support-
ing Mossadeq. At this stage it was decided to alter the
nature and number of documents which would have to be signed
by the Shah. These documents would be limited to one firman
naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff and one letter denouncing
the government-staged referendum on the question of the
dissolution of the Majlis as an illegal proceeding. As
28
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
the month of july ened, station personnel in charge of
the proganda campaign reported on the effective anti-
[ ]. It was stated that
very effective use had been made of the 28 July statemen
by Secretary of State Dulles* (made at CIA's suggestion).
A request was made that US papers reflect the Iranian
press campaign against Mossadeq and that inspired articles
be placed in the US pres..
On 1 August, two days after Princess Ashraf had left
Iran and the Shah had heard the BBC message designed to
convince him that Asadollah Rashidian was the official
spokesman of the UK Government, Schwarzkopf had an ex-
tended meeting with the Shah. Fearful of planted micro-
phones, the Shah led the General into a grand ballroom,
pulled a small table to its exact center, and then both
sat on the table. The Shah rejected the proposal that he
sign the required documents at once, asserting that he was
not fully confident of the loyalty of the army; that he
must give advance approval for all members of a new cabinet;
____________________
*This statement, made at a press conference, was as
follows: "The growing activities of the illegal Communist
Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian
Government has caused our government concern. These
developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran."
29
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
and that he must have time to make his own estimate as to
the probable success or failure of the undertaking. On
the other hand, he said that should Mossadeq carry through
his referendum and dissolve the Majlis then he, himself,
would ahve full powers under the constitution to dismiss
Mossadeq and replace him by a prime minister of his own
choice. This meeting was to be followed by a series of
additional ones, some between Roosevelt and the Shah and
some between Rashidian and the Shah, in which relentless
pressure was exerted in frustrating attempts to overcome
an entrenched attitude of vacillation and indecision.
On 2 August Roger Goiran, for so long the exprienced
and valuable chief of station, left Tehran headed for Head-
quarters duty. Whiel his knowledge had been of inestimable
value in the preparatory stages of TPAJAX, it was judged
that his departure as just this time would be an important
factor in the war of nerves against Mossadeq, and in the
planned efforts to confuse and disturb the potential oppo-
sition. By this time the Counselor, Gordon Henry Mattison,
and the ranking political officer, Mr. Roy Malcolm Melbourne,
had been briefed on TPAJAX and were discreetly helpful.
Mattison, in interviews with [ ]
[ ], followed station direction in a successful
effort to divert attention of the [ ] group
30
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
from the real purpose of TPAJAX.
During this period Mossadeq, as always, had been on
the alert to try to hold the initiative and keep his grow-
ing opposition off balance. His attention turned toward
the Majlis, where opposition appeared to be hardening. On
14 July he directed the deputies supporting the government
to resign. Several of the neutral or timidly anti-Mossadeq
deputies followed suit until a total of 28 had resigned.
Headquarters urged that the anti-Mossadeq deputies be given
every encouragement to keep their posts and to take up bast
(political sanctuary) in the Majlis. The theme to be built
up was that those who had not resigned from the Majlis
would constitute the legitimate parliamentary body. This
stand was at least partially responsible for Mossadeq's
growing belief that the body must be dissolved. Such
action would leave him as the undisputed dictator of the
country since his full-powers bill had several months more
to run. However, he still had to get around the provision
of the constitution that only the Shah had the authority
to dissolve the Majlis. He did this by staging a national
referendum in which the people were to state "yes" or "no"
to the question as to whether the Majlis should be dis-
solved. The referendum was a clear and palpable fake. Held
throughout the country beginning 4 August, some two million
31
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
were said to have voted for dissolution and only a few
hundred against. As a maneuver the action was not as
satisfactory as Mossadeq anticipated since it clearly re-
vealed abuse of the constitution. This provide an issue
on which Mossadeq could be relentlessly attacked by the
CIA/SIS subsidized opposition press. The action also did
much to alarm the more stable and established elements of
the populace, who were nationalists along with everyone
else, but who did not favor such a fraudulent breach of
the constitution.
During the days of the referendum the station reported
in detail on the multiple efforts of station agents to ex-
ploit the illegality of this referendum, both before and
during the event. Also every declaration made by a religious
leader in these days stressed this point. The station indi-
cated that some 20 local newspapers were now in violent
opposition to Mossadeq and that some 15 Headquarters-
prepared anti-Mossadeq cartoons had appeared in these
papers during the referendum week. On 4 August word reached
the station that Mossadeq was aware of teh true purpose of
the visit of Ashraf, and the personnel on the scene felt
strongly that action must be mounted very soon. On 4 August
Ambassador Henerson per schedule set out from Salzburg for
Tehran. He was to be met on 9 August at Beirut by Leavitt,
32
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
who persuaded him to put off his return in view of the
delayed but imminent date for action. In these same days,
Henerson, officials of the State Department, and officials
of the Foreign Office were drafting proposed statements
which their governments planned to issue upon the success-
ful conclusion of TPAJAX.
At Tehran the meetings with the Shah were continuing.
On 2 August Asodollah Rashidian had presented His Majesty
with specific details concerning the manner in which the
operation would be carried out, and reported that the Shah
had agreed to dismiss Mossadeq and to appoint Zahedi as
both Prime Minister and Deputy Commander-in-Chief. The
Shah also agreed to name General Vosua as Chief of Staff.
On 3 August, Roosevelt had a long and inconclusive session
with the Shah. The latter stated that he was not an adven-
turer and, hence, could not take the chances of one.
Roosevelt pointed out that there was no other way by which
the government could be changed and the test was now be-
tween Mossadeq and his force and the Shah and his army,
which was still with him, but which would soon slip away.
Roosevelt finally said that he would remain at hand a few
days longer in expectation of an affirmative decision and
then would leave the country; in the latter case the Shah
should realize that failure to act could lead only to a
33
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
Comunist Iran or to a second Korea. he concluded by say-
ing that his government was not prepared to accept these
possibilities and that some other plan might be carried
through. In a later meeting with the Shah, the latter
requested Mr. Roosevelt to solicit from President Eisen-
hower assuracnes that it was advisable for the Shah to
take the initiative in removing Mossadeq. Mr. Roosevelt
stated that he would pass this request on to the President,
but he was very confident that the latter would adopt the
attitude that the Shah had already had US desires made
adequately clear to him. By complete coincidence and good
fortune, the President, while addressing the Governors'
Convention in Seattle on 4 August, deviated from his script
to state by implicaiton that the United States would not
sit idly by and see Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain.
Mr. Roosevelt used the President's statements to good effect,
by telling the Shah that Eisenhowere did indeed feel further
assurances of US attitude toward Mossadeq were unnecessary
but that his reference to Iran in the Governors' Convention
speech was made to satisfy the Shah. In the end the Shah
said he would again discuss the question with Rashidian.
In the cable describing this meeting, Roosevelt stated his
belief that it was hopeless to attempt to proceed without
the Shah, and that it must be decided whether to exert
34
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
ultimate pressure for the next two or three days or to
accept a delay of up to ten days in which the Shah might
finally be won over. On 7 August Rashidian met again
with the Shah who agreeed that action should be taken on
the night of either the 10th or 11th. On 8 August Roose-
velt agains saw the Shah and struggled against a mood of
stubborn irresolution which broke down to the extent that
the Shah agreed to give oral encouragement to selected
army officers who would participate in the action. Then,
he said, he would go to Ramsar* and let the army act with-
out his official knowledge, adding that if the action was
successful he would name Zahedi as Prime Minister. On
9 August Rashidian took over the struggle in his turn and
reported that the Shah would leave for Ramsar on the 12th,
and that prior to his departure he would see Zahedi and
key officers and express orally his choice of Zahedi as
the new head of the government.
On 10 August Colonel [Hassan Akhavi] saw the Shah and
informed him of the names of the army officers who were
ready to take action upon receipt of an order from the
Shah. The Shah again asserted that while he approved
of the plan for action he would sign no papers. [Akhavi]
____________________
*Royal resort on the Caspian Sea, north of Tehran.
35
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
registered a protest at this decision, and the Shah again
sent for Rashidian to discuss this all important point.
Rashidian carried a message from Roosevelt to the effect
that the latter would leave in complete disgust unless
the Shah took action within a few days. At the conclusion
of the audience the Shah stated that he would sign the
papers, would see Zahedi, and then would leave for Ramsar
on the Caspian. The next day he did see Zahedi and did
leave for Ramsar, but the papers, contrary to the promise
of the Rashidians, were not ready for the signature of the
Shah. The Shah thus promised to sign the papaers as soon
as they were sent to him at Ramsar.
After discussion between Roosevelt and Rashidian, they
reverted to a decision closer to the original London draft
of TPAJAX, deciding that there should be two firmans royal
decrees), one dismissing Mossadeq and one naming Zahedi as
Prime Minister. Rashidian and [Behbudi], the Shah's [palace]
[head] and an established UK agent, prepared the documents,
and on the evening of 12 August [Colonel Nematollah Nasiri],
[Commander of the Imperial Guard] took them by plane to
Ramsar.
At this time the psychological campaign against
Mossadeq was reaching its climax. The controllable press
was going all out against Mossadeq, while [ ]
36
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
[ ] under station direction was printing
material which the station considered to be helpful. CIA
agents gave serious attention to alarming the religious
leaders at Tehran by issuing black propaganda in the name
of the Tudeh Party, threatening these leaders with savage
punishment if they opposed Mossadeq. Threatening phone
calls were made to some of them, in the name of the Tudeh,
and one of several planned sham bombings of the houses
of these leaders was carried out.
The word that the Shah would support direct action in
his behalf spread rapidly through the "Colonels' conspiracy"
fostered by the station. Zahedi saw station principal
agent, Colonel [Aban Farzanegan], and named him as liaison
officer with the Americans and as his choice to supervise
the staff planning for the action. Then [Farzanegan] took
General [Batmangelich] and Colonel [Zand-Karmini] to see Zahedi.
CIA officer Carroll maintained close contact with [Farzanegan]
and members of the "Colonels' conspiracy," and on 13 August
was present at the final meeting of those individuals to
whom would fall the responsibility of carrying out the
operational staff plan. However, this meeting was the
last one in which the station was represented, and the
fact that contact was broken proved to have serious results.
Late on the evening of 13 August, Colonel [Nasiri]
37
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
returned to Tehran with the firmans signed by the Shah
and delivered them to Zahedi; according to his story
(which has never been confirmed), it was Queen Soraya
who finally convinced the Shah that he must sign. If
this is true, here was an ally form a totally unexpected
quarter.
On 14 August the station cabled that upon the con-
clusion of TPAJAX the Zahedi government, in view of the
empty treasury of the country, would be in urgent need
of funds. The sum of $5,000,000 was suggested, and CIA
was asked to produce this amount almost within hours after
the conclusion of the operation. No more news came in
from Tehran on the 14th, and there was nothing that either
the station or Headquarters could do except wait for action
to begin.
38
S E C R E T
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