Redactions in this section could not be restored, shown as [ ];
supposed redactions shown by [ ] are based on restored redactions
of other sections.
S E C R E T
II. DRAFTING THE PLAN
Near the end of April 1953 Dr. Donald N. Wilber, cov-
ert consultant to NEA, was selected by the Division to go
to Nicosia and, in close collaboration with SIS, draw up
a plan for the overthrow of Mossadeq. The assumption by
Headquarters was that the planners would come up with a
project which they could conscientiously recommend.
The discussions were begun at Nicosia on 13 May 1953
between Wilber and SIS Officer Norman Matthew Darbyshire.
Occasionally Mr. H. John Collins, Chief of SIS station at
Nicosia, was also present. Mr. Darbyshire, who was in
charge of SIS's Iran branch, had been in Iran for several
years and was fluent in the language. Discussions were
concluded on 30 May 1953, and the completed draft of a
recommended operational plan was cabled by Dr. Wilber to
Headquarters on 1 June.
The opening meetins consisted of a review of all
the important personalities on the political scene in
Iran with a view toward determining whether General Zahedi,
the most prominent politician in opposition to Mossadeq,
was in fact the sole figure worthy of support and, if so,
what individuals and elements should be enlisted in his
support. It soon became apparent that Dr. Wilber and
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Mr. Darbyshire held quite similar views of Iranian person-
alities and had made very similar estimates of the factors
involved in the Iranian political scene. There was no
friction or marked difference of opinion during the dis-
cussions. It alsop quickely became apparent that the SIS
was perfectly content to follow whatever lead was taken
by the Agency. It seemed obvious to Wilber that the Brit-
ish were very pleased at having obtained the active coop-
eration of the Agency and were determined to do nothing
which might jeopardize US participation. At the same time
there was a faint note of envy expressed over the fact that
the Agency was better equipped in the way of funds, person-
nel, and facilities than was SIS.
Wilber reported the preliminary conversations concern-
ing a three-way channel, set up for this occasion, which
was designed to insure immediate relay between Washington,
Nicosia, and Tehran. That is, a message originating at any
one of these places would be sent by the most expeditious
route to the other two. This route was the Middle East
Communications Authority (MECA) link, the relay station
a few miles outside of Nicosia.*
_____________________
*Unfortunately, communications between Nicosia and
Tehran were not as rapid as was hoped during this
period in which more than 45 cables were exchanged.
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Discussions at Nicosia moved on to a disclosure of
assets by both parties. Those by SIS were centered upon
the contacts of the Rashidian brothers in such fields as
the armed forces, the Majlis (Iranian Parliament), reli-
gious leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians, and
other influential figures. When this material was relayed
from Nicosia, the Tehran Station commented that it was
their belief that these assets had been far overstated
and oversold. In reply it was pointed out that SIS was
as aware as we of the weaknesses of the Rashidians, but
that one of the strongest points in their favor was their
avowed willingness to risk their possessions and their
lives in an attempt against Mossadeq. In the critical
days of August 1953 the Rashidians did display such a
willingness. SIS disclosures were followed by those of
Dr. Wilber for CIA. Prior to Wilber's departure a dis-
cussion was held at Headquarters to determine which of the
station assets should be disclosed to the SIS in return for
promised disclosures by the SIS of the assets which they
were prepared to put into an operational plan. It was
agreed at Headquarters that the identities of the vitally
important principal agents of the Tehran Station, [Djalili]
[and Keyvani]
[ ] would not be disclosed. Since the SIS had been
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S E C R E T
informed during the November 1952 meetings referred to
above that CIA had two major principal agents in Iran, it
was necessary to offer two such in place of [Djalili and]
[Keyvani]. This was done, naming a station agent and a
sub-agent** of [ ] to these important posts.
To the best of our knowledge [Djalili and Keyvani] were not
uncovered by the Rashidian brothers or any other SIS agents
during the course of this operation.
The continuing conversations at Nicosia were reflected
by outgoing cables requesting, principally from the Tehran
Station, information which would be helpful in drafting the
operational plan.
Discussions now narrowed down to a series of basic
assumptions which were stressed both in the draft plan and
in its final form. It was determined that the details of
the operational plan should be included within a framework
of such basic assumptions as these: that Zahedi alone of
potential candidates had the vigor and courage to make him
worthy of support; that the Shah must be brought into the
operation; that the Shah would act only with great reluc-
tance but that he could be forced to do so; that if the
______________________
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
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issue was clear-cut the armed forces would follow the
Shah rather than Mossadeq; that the operation must, if
possible, be made to appear legal or quasi-legal instead
of an outright coup; that public opinion must be fanned
to fever pitch against Mossadeq in the period just preceding
the execution of the overthrow operation; that the military
aspect would be successful only if the station were able
to review the plan with the Iranians chosen by Zahedi to
execute it; that immediate precautions must be taken by
the new government to meet a strong reaction by the Tudeh
Party. Some of these assumptions were presented in cables
sent off before the draft plan was completed. The reactions
from the Tehran Station and Headquarters did not always
express agreement with the ideas of the planners. The
station expressed its feeling that the Shah would not act
decisively against Mossadeq, while Headquarters wondered
whether we should not support some other individual and
whether the Persians themselves might not take the lead in
action designed to overthrow Mossadeq. It was, however,
agreed that the station should begin at once with its new
policy of attacking the government of Mossadeq through grey
propaganda. The station relayed this line to its own agents
and passed it on to the Rashidian brothers of SIS. The CIA
Art Group, a section of the PP Staff Advisory Panel, was
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asked to prepare a considerable number of anti-Mossadeq
cartoons.
The meetings were interrupted for several days when
one of the Rashidian brothers managed to get permission to
leave Iran*--not at all an easy matter during the Mossadeq
period--and went to Geneva where he was met by SIS Officer
Norman Darbyshire. He not only briefed Darbyshire on the
current situation but was able to give comprehensive answers
to a number of specific questions. It should be noted that
the SIS station at Nicosia had been in tri-weekly wireless
contact with the Rashidian brothers at Tehran, employing
the best of the Britishtrained staybehind operators. This
contact, in Persian, was naturally limited in time, and
even more limited after we passed word to Darbyshire on his
return from Geneva that the Iranian armed forces were now
in possession of directional finders supplied under MAAG.
Mr. George A. Carroll (FI Deputy Tehran, Designate)
arrived at Nicosia on 29 May, in time to pass along reactions
____________________
*It is interesting to note that Rashidian obtained his
exit visa to leave Iran and his reentry permit from
no less a supporter of Mossadeq than Foreign Minister
Hoseyn Fatemi. This lends some evidence to long held
CIA views that Fatemi was from time to time susceptible
to British overtures and was trying to keep a hand in
with the opposition and British in the event Mossadeq
fell. He was certainly aware of Rashidian's agent
status with the British.
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and suggestions from Headquarters, prior to the completion of
the draft plan. As stated, this draft was cabled to Head-
wuarters on 1 June 1953. (See Appendix A for a typed
transcript of the cable.)
While Nicosia proved to be a hand point of contact with
the British and a fairly good communications intersection
point, it di have certain disadvantages. It was remote
from the headquarters of either agency, and, even worse, the
SIS station files were extremely inadequate so that any in-
formation on personalities, especially members of the Iranian
armed forces, had to be obtained by querying the Tehran
Station and Headquarters.
Once the draft paln had been cabled, it was agreed with
SIS that their copy would be hand-carried to London where
the viewpoint of the SIS headquarters would be incorporated
prior to 15 June. In the meantime, as had been agreed with
Headquarteers, the Agency would conduct a searching scrutiny
of the plan at Beirut, and then bring these results to Lon-
don for amalgamation with the draft as reworked by SIS at
London. Carroll remained a few days after the completion of
the draft to begin work on the military aspect of the plan.
He also returned to Nicosia for a few additional days after
the close of the Beirut meetings for this purpose. It must
be noted that Miss Helen E. Morgan, CIA representative at
Nicosia, gave strong support to the CIA personnel who worked
at Nicosia.
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