There were no redactions in this section.
S E C R E T
III. CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN
On the afternoon of 9 June all those who were to take
part in the discussions arrived in Beirut: Mr. Kermit
Roosevelt, Chief NEA and project chief throughout the
operation, came in by plane from London; Carroll came
from Cyprus by plane; Roger Goiran, Chief of Station at
Tehran, drove on from Damascus by car; and Wilber came in
from Cairo by air.
On the morning of 10 June the talks got underway and
continued for four days. The usual schedule was to start
quite early, carry through until about two o'clock, and
then assemble again in the late afternoon. The first order
of business was a reexamination of all the factors and ele-
ments of the political scene in Iran in the light of the
current and comprehensive information supplied by the
Tehran chief of station. After all the basic principles
of the draft paln had been accepted, the attention of the
conferees turned to a section by section consideration of
the plan. The object of the meetings was to determine how
each section could be given the maximum structure and im-
pact. One switch in general outlook was made that was most
salutary for all later thinking. The draft plan had implied
that definite counteraction would have to be taken against
some of the strongest elements supporting Mossadeq, such as
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the Qashqai tribal leaders; but it was now decided that
every effort should be devoted to increasing the size and
effectiveness of the anti-Mossadeq forces, the assumption
being that Mossadeq's supporting elements would not react
once their leader was out of the picture.
The Tehran chief of station suggested that an alter-
native plan to provide for the overthrow of Mossadeq be
developed. This was to become the Amini/Qashqai plan
which the station kept alive as a possible alternative
until the successful conclusion of TPAJAX.
Saturday afternoon the group held its final meeting
and on the next morning, 14 June, departed by plane for
its several destinations.
Roosevelt and Wilber arrived in London on 15 June and
reported to the main offices of the SIS at 54 Broadway.
They turned over the Beirut revision of the plan. No copy
of the original Beirut draft exists, since it was reworked
to form the final "London" draft.
The London meetings were held in one of the conference
rooms at 54 Broadway, notable only for a large sign with
the legend in red, "Curb Your Guests." For the SIS,
Commander Maurice M. Firth and Norman Darbyshire, who had
come on from Nicosia by way of Geneva (where he had seen
Asadollah Rashidian a second time before the latter went
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back to Iran) were always present. Upon occasion Major
P.(Paddy) J. Keen, whose post seemed to be that of desk
officer for several Middle East countries, also participated.
Montague Woodhouse, clearly one of their most highly esteemed
officers, attended a single meeting but had little to con-
tribute.
From the moment the discussion began, it was clear that
the SIS had no major comments of their own on the draft plan.
Nor did they have much to say on the Beirut version beyond a
certain close attention to phraseology. As at Nicosia it was
apparent that the Americans were to be placated and allowed
to run things as they pleased. They did, however, seem to
have abundant confidence in the plan and in the successful
outcome of the operation, and said that the Rashidians would
be ordered to follow completely the orders of CIA's Tehran
Station.
At the final meeting those present reviewed the future
conduct of affairs. The SIS officers stated that they
thought it would take some time to obtain a firm decision
from their government as to the approval or non-approval
of the plan.
Roosevelt and Wilber left London on 17 June, and
Roosevelt was back in his office by noon of the 18th.
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There the plan was immediately reconstructed and typed
up. (It is given as Appendix B and it should be read
at this point in the chronological account of the
operation.)
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