VII. APPARENT FAILURE
At 0545 hours on the morning of 16 August 1953, Radio
Tehran came on the air with a special government communique
covering the so-called abortive coup of the night just end-
ing, and by 0600 hours Mossadeq was meeting with his cabinet
to receive reports on the situation and to take steps to
strengthen the security forces at government buildings and
other vital points. Again at 0730 hours the communique was
broadcast.
Station personnel had passed an anxious, sleepless
night in their office. From the fact that certain actions
provided for in the military plan failed to materialize--
no jeep with radio arrived at the compound, and the tele-
phone system continued to function--it was obvious that
something--or everything--had gone wrong. At 0500 hours,
as soon as the curfew was lifted, Carroll toured the town
and reported there was a concentration of tanks and troops
around Mossadeq's house, and other security forces on the
move. Then Colonel [Farzanegan] called the office to say
that things had gone badly, and he, himself, was on
the run toward the Embassy in search of refuge. At 0600
hours he appeared, gave a summary of the situation, which
was like that of the government communique, and was rushed
44
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S E C R E T
into hiding. The station was now suddenly faced with the
task of rescuing the operation from total failure, and
decisions of far-reaching effect were quickly taken. The
first need was to establish contact with Ardeshir Zahedi,
son of General Zahedi. At 0800 hours he sent word to the
station of his whereabouts, and Roosevelt drove up to
Shimran--the summer resort section north of Tehran--to hear
that Areshir and his father felt that there was still hope
in the situation. It was immediately decided that a strong
effort must be made to convince the Iranian public that
Zahedi was the legal head of the government and that Mossadeq
was the usurper who had staged a coup. (It should be noted
that all action taken from this time on corresponded to the
basic estimate of the operational plan that the army would
respond to the Shah if they were forced to a choice between
the ruler and Mossadeq.) This action was initiated by em-
ploying station communications facilities to relay a message
to the New York Associated Press (AP) office stating that:
"Unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders
of the plot are armed with two decrees of the Shah, one
dismissing Mossadeq and the other appointing General Zahedi
to replace him." In order to get an authoritative state-
ment that could be distributed for local consumption, the
station planned to send General McClure, head of the American
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S E C R E T
Military Mission, to see the Shah and ask him whether the
alleged firmans were valid. Later in the day it was learned
that the Shah had fled.
By 0930 hours the city was calm, with shops opening
and people going about their normal business. However,
tanks, extra soldiers, and police were stationed at key
points, including the royal palaces which were sealed off
from outside contact. Rumors began to circulate. The one
that gained early attention was to the effect that the
alleged coupt had been inspired by the government in order
to give Mossadeq an excuse to move against the Shah. At
about this time Roosevelt sent General McClure to see General
Riahi, Chief of Staff, to ask whether the US Military Mission
was still accredited to Mossadeq or someone else, as the
Embassy had heard that an imperial firman had been issued
naming Zahedi as Prime Minister. Riahi denied that the
firman had been "authentically signed" and stated that:
"Iran and its people are more important than the Shah or
any particular government," and that the army was "of the
people and would support the people." It was not until a
number of hours later that McClure reported to Roosevelt
on this meeting, and from the time of the meeting on, McClure
seemed disposed to go along with Riahi in the hope that Riahi
himself might eventually try to overthrow Mossadeq.
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S E C R E T
It was now well into the morning, after the papers had
been out for some time. Shojat, the substitute for the
principal Tudeh paper, Besuye Ayandeh, had been predicting
a coup since 13 August. It now stated that the plans for
the alleged coup had been made after a meeting between the
Shah and General Shwarkkopf on 9 August, but that Mossadeq
had been tipped off on the 14th. It should be noted that
the Tudeh appeared to be at least as well posted on the coup
plans as the government--how is not known. The station prin-
cipal agent team of [Djalili and Keyvani] working on their
own and with singular shrewdness, had put out a special
broadsheet with documented the current rumor but twisted it
to read that the alleged coup was arranged to force out the
Shah. The morning issue of Mellat-i-Ma told this same story,
while a first mention of the firman naming Zahedi was given
on an inner page of the large circulation daily Keyhan.
At 1000 hours another communique added a few details
to the earlier one. By this time the Tudeh party members,
organized in small groups, were making speeches in many
parts of teh city, while smaller groups of pro-Mossadeq
nationalists were also out in the streets. Then a fresh
rumor made the rounds: that a plot had existed but that,
when it had failed to materialize, Mossadeq had staged a
fake coup. At 1100 hours two correspondents of the New
47
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S E C R E T
York Times were taken to Shimran, by station arrangement,
to see Zahedi. Instead, they say his sone, Ardeshir, who
showed them the original of the imperial firman naming
Zahedi as Prime Minister and gave them photostatic copies.
These photostats had been made by Iranian participants in
the plan. Following this meeting the station took charge
of the firman, had its own photostats made, and kep the
original locked up in the station safe until final victory.
At noon RAdio Tehran put out a very brief statement signed
by Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq (without his title of Prime Minister
being used) stating that: "According to the will of the
people, expressed by referendum, the 17th Majlis is dissolved.
Elections for the 18th session will be held soon." It was
this statement, together with the following violently anti-
Shah remarks of Fatemi and teh undisguised and freely-preached
republican propaganda of the Tudeh Party, that was instru-
mental in persuading the general public that Mossadeq was
on the verge of eliminating the monarchy.
At 1400 hours Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi held
a press conference. He stated that for some time past the
government had received reports from several sources to the
effect that the Imperial Guards were planning a coup and,
hence, measures were taken to counteract any such coup. He
then went on to review the incidents of the coup, as already
48
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stated by teh government communiques. In reply to a ques-
tion, he said that Abul Ghassem Amini, Acting Minister of
Court, had been arrested since it could not be considered
that the court was not a part of the conspriacy. He added
that his own views would be found in his editorial in
Bakhtar Emruz: this editorial, as printed and as read in
full, over Radio Tehran at 1730 hours, was a save, lengthy,
malicious attack upon the Shah and upon Reza Shah--a man
for who the general public still feels a large measure of
respect and awe. It may be said that this editorial did
a great deal to arouse public resentment against the govern-
ment of Mossadeq.
During the afternoon the station was at work preparing
a public statement from General Zahedi which was prepared
with the direct advice of Ardeshir Zahedi, the Rashidian
brothers, and Colonel [Farzanegan.] When it was ready the
agents were unable to find a press in town which was not
watched by the government. Therefore, one of the Rashidians
did ten copies on a Persian typewriter. These were rushed
to General Zahedi for his signature adn then given out to
the foreign correspondents, to local pressmen and to two
key army officers. By the time they were distributed, it
was too late to catch the press for the morning of the 17th.
However, station agents, [(Djalili and Keyvani),] although not
49
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in touch with the station, the Rashidians, or [Farzanegan,]
went ahead on their own. They composed a fabricated inter-
view with Zahedi and had it printed on the 17th, along with
a copy of the firman. In this instance, as in a number of
others, the high-level agents of the station demonstrated
a most satisfying ability to go ahead on their own and do
just the right thing. During the day the station was
securing the persons of key individuals and sending them
to safety. Some were concealed in the house of a station
clerk in the Embassy compound and some in the houses of US
personnel of the station outside the compound. Thus,
Ardeshir Sahedi was in station hands from the morning of
the 16th on, General Zahedi from the morning of the 17th
on, the Rashidian brothers from the 16th on with the excep-
tion of a venture out on the 18th, Colonel [Farzanegan] from
the morning of the 16th on, and General [Guilanshah] from the
morning of the 16th. These people had to be concealed by
the station, both in order to secure them from arrest and
also to have them in places to which Americans could logi-
cally and easily go.
That evening about 1930 hours crwods massed in the
Majlis Square to hear speeches, and the proceedings were
rebroadcast over Radio Tehran. The speakers included pro-
Mossadeq ex-Majlis deputies Mosavi, Dr. Szyyid Ali Shayegan,
Engineer Zirakzadeh, Engineer Razavi, and Foreign Minister
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Fatemi. All the speakers attacked the Shah and demanded
that he abdicate. During the course of these speeches,
the public was informed for the first time that the Shah
had fled to Baghdad. The station had learned several
hours earlier that the Shah had left. By 1600 hours the
two principal US Embassy political officers had given up
hope, while Roosevelt was insisting there was still a
"slight remaining chance of success" if the Shah would use
the Baghadad radio and if Zahedi took and aggressive stand.
Additional station messages to Headquarters contained the
texts of the type of statements the Shah could make over
Baghdad radio.
Allowing for the seven hour difference in time, Head-
quarters received the first message from the station on the
non-success of the coup at 0130 hours on the 16th, and a
few hours thereafter was working on the station's request
to get the Shah to broadcast from Baghdad. As the working
day ended, they had to report to the station that the State
Department was firmly opposed to any American effort to
contact the Shah and suggested the British do it. At
Nicosia they responded enthusiastically to the station's
suggestion, and the SIS attempted to get permission from
London to have Leavitt and Darbyshire flown to Baghdad by
RAF jet fighter early in the morning of the 17th, for the
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S E C R E T
purpose of exerting pressure on the Shah. Londong refused
permission.
As the station personnel entered on another day after
a second sleepless night, some real encouragement came from
word that, in breaking up Tudeh groups late the night before,
the soldiers had beaten them with rifle butts and made them
shout, "Long live the Shan." The station continued to feel
that the "project was not quite dead" since General Zahedi
General [Guilanshah], the Rashidian brothers, and Colonel
[Farzanegan] were still determined to press action.
Now, on the morning of 17 August, the press was again
on the streets. Niruye Sevum stated that Schwarzkopf
engineered the plot with the Shah and that "simple-minded
Americans thought the Shah was a trump card." Dad and Shahed
both blamed the so-called coup on the government, and Keyhan
carried the text of an alleged Radio London statement quoting
Zahedi to the effect that he had a firman from the Shah and
that the Shah had left because his life was threatened.
Throughout the morning Iranians with good radios were able
to get word from foreign stations of statements that the
Shah had made in Baghdad. He said: "What has taken place
in Iran cannote be considered a coup d'etat in the real sense."
The Shad said he had issued his orders for the dismissal of
Dr. Mossadeq under the prerogatives given to him by the
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constitution, and had appointed General Zahedi in his
place. He went on to say that he had not abdicated and
that he was confident of the loyalty of the Iranian people
to him. This line was what the station had in mind, if
less strong than desired; and the Baghdad papers hinted
that painful, bloody events were still to come in Iran.
The station suggested that Imam Khalasi, religious divine
at Baghdad, and the Agha Khan be enlisted to give the Shah
moral backing, while Headquarters, on State Department
instructions, continued to refuse permission for direct
US contact with the Shah. In the meantime the US Ambassa-
dor to Iraq, Burton Berry, reported on his conversation
with the Shah on the evening of the 16th. His statements,
made on his own initiative, were quite in line with sugges-
tions reaching him after the event.
About 1000 hours a considerable body of the troops
that had been dispersed throughout the city were called
back to their barracks, as the government was certain the
situation was well in hand. At 1030 hours Radio Tehran
called up General Zahedi to surrender to the authorities,
and then began broadcasting lists of those arrested as
having taken part in the abortive coup or having had some
connection with those events. The separate lists, includ-
ing those of the next day, contained the following names
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(those underlined indicate the individuals who were known to
the station to be engaged in the coup attempt):
[Acting Minister of Court Abul Ghassem Amini
Colonel Novzari, Commander of 2nd Armored Brigade
Colonel Zand-Karimi, Chief of Staff of 2nd Mountain
Brigade
Commander Poulad Daj of the Police
Colonel Nematollah Nasiri, Commander of Imperial
Guards
Lt. Colonel Azamudeh, Reg. CO 1st Mountain Brigade
Colonel Parvaresh, head of the Officers' Club
1st Lieutenant Niahi
Mr. Perron, Swiss subject
General Nadr Batmangelich, retired
Colonel Hadi Karayi, Commander of Imperial Guards
at Namsar
General Shaybani, retired
Rahim Hirad, Chief of Shah's private secretariat
Soleiman Behbudi, Chief of Shah's household
Lt. Colonel Hamidi, Asst. Director of Police visa section
Colonel Mansurpur, Squadron Leader (cavalry)
Colonel Rowhani, Chief of Staff of 3rd Mountain Brigade
Captain Baladi
1st Lieutenant Naraghi
Captain Shaghaghi
Captain Salimi
1st Lieutenant Eskandari
1st Lieutenant Jafarbey
Mr. Ashtari
Mr. Mohammed Jehandari
1st Lieutenant Rauhani
Dr. Mozaffar Baqai]
Rumors circulated to the effect that the arrested
officers were to be hanged on 20 August, and throughout
the unit commands of the Tehran garrison, the police, and
the gendarmerie, officers met to discuss the situation.
Several of them resolved to risk all to attempt to rescue
their friends.
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S E C R E T
The station devoted a great deal of effort during
the day to circulating photostatic copies of the firman--
particularly among the army--and in trying to arrange
for more and more press coverage. It was now obvious
that public knowledge of the existence of the firmans
was having an effect. Everyone was asking questions:
"Was it true that the Shah had issued the firmans? If so,
why was Mossodeq lying about it? Wasn't that a most
reprehensible thing to do?"
At 1325 hours Fatemi held a press conference at
which he dealt with the flight of the Shah to Iraq, read
the abjectly pleading letter from arrested Acting Minister
of Court Armini, and stated that 14 officers had been arrested.
His more detailed views on the current situation were ex-
pressed in an editorial in Bakhtar Emruz and were in the
main a repetition of his previous scurrilou attacks against
the Shah. He wrote such words as, "O traitor Shah, you
shameless person, you have completed the criminal history
of the Pahlevi reign. The people...want to drag you from
behind your desk to the gallows."
EArly in the afternoon, Ambassador Henderson arrived
in Tehran from Beirut. On the way out to the airport to
meet him, members of the Embassy passed the site of the
bronze statue of Reza Shah at the end of the avenue of
55
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S E C R E T
that name. Only the boots of teh figure remained on the
pedestal. A passing truck was dragging behind it the horse
from the equestrian statue of the same ruler that had stood
in Sepah Square. In the crowds engaged in this activity,
the Tudeh were obviously in the majority.
On behalf of the government, Henderson was welcomed
by Dr. Gholam Hosein Mossadeq, son of the Prime Minister,
and by Dr. Alemi, Minister of Labor. At 1630 hours the
station sent off a cable giving a general survey of the
local situation which, although it foresaw Mossadeq's
position strengthened for the next few weeks, did insist
that a policy of opposition to him be continued. Near the
end of the afternoon, the government used the voice of a
religious leader, Sadr Balaghi, to attack the Shah over
Radio Tehran.
The evening was a most active and trying time for the
station. Principal agents [Keyvani and Djalili] were reached
and given instructions. Within the Embassy compound,
Roosevelt and Carroll held a prolonged council of war with
the heads of their team: General Zahedi and Ardeshir
Zahedi, General [Guilanshah,] the three Rashidian brothers,
and Colonel [Farzanegan]. These teammates were, when re-
quired, smuggled in and out of the compound in the bottom
of cars and in closed jeeps. A few hundred yards away
56
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S E C R E T
Ambassador Henderson and General McClure were out in the
garden in front of the residency, and Roosevelt wore a
path back and forth to reassure them that no Persians were
hidden out in the compound, so that they could in all hon-
esty so inform Mossadeq if the question were asked. The
council of war went on for about four hours, and in the
end it was decided that some action would be taken on
Wednesday the 19th. As preparation for this effort, several
specific activities were to be undertaken. In the field of
political action, it was planned to send the Tehran cleric
[Ayatollah Behbehani] to Qum to try to persuade the supreme
cleric, Ayatollah Borujerdi, to issue a fatwa (religious
decree) calling for a holy war against Communism, and also
to build up a great demonstration on Wednesday on the theme
that it was time for loyal army officers and soldiers and
the people to rally to the support of religion and the
throne. In the field of military action, support from
outside of Tehran seemed essential. Colonel [Farzanegan]
was sent off in a car driven by a station agent (US national
Gerald Towne) to [Kermanshah, a distance of 400 miles,] to
persuade Colonel [Timur Bakhtiar,] commanding officer of the
[Kermanshah] garrison, to declare for the Shah. Zahedi, with
Carroll, was sent to Brigadier General [Zargham] at [Isfahan]
with a similar request. Through station facilities these
57
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messengers were provided with identification papers and
travel papers which stood up under inspection. All those
leaving the compound were also given station-prepared
curfew passes.
Throughout the long hours of 17 August, there seemed
little that Headquarters could do to ease the pangs of
despair. A wire sent to the station in the afternoon
expressed the strong feeling that Roosevelt, in the interest
of safety, should leave at the earliest moment, and it went
on to express distress over the bad luck. At about the
same time, an operational immediate cable went out to
Ambassador Beery in Baghdad with guidance concerning his
future meetings with the Shah. Propaganda guidance was
sent to the stations in Karachi, New Delhi, Cairo, Damascus,
Istanbul, and Beirut to the effect that the Zahedi govern-
ment was the only legal one. Just after midnight Headquarters
urged a Paris Station officer in southern France to get in
touch with the Agha Khan at once, in order to urge the latter
to send a wire to the Shah expressing his strongest moral
support. Much later, Headquarters learned that contact
had been established, but there was not the hoped-for outcome.
The Agha Khan had at once stated that a ruler who left his
throne and country would never return, and after his state-
ment no effort was made to sell him on the idea of backing
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the Shah. Of course, he was later delighted to hear that
the Shah did get his throne back after all.
At Nicosia the SIS refused to give up hope, and bucked
against their own office in London and against the Foreign
Office. Darbyshire continued to try to get permission to
got to Baghdad. While the persistence and apparent faith
shown by the SIS station at Nicosia was altogether admira-
ble, it should be remembered that they had nothing to lose
if the cause had been pressed to ultimate failure and dis-
closure.
The 18th was to be the most trying day for every person
in every country who was aware of the project. At 0730 hours
that morning the Shah left Baghdad for Rome on a regular BOAC
commercial flight. It would be some hours before this news
reched Tehran. In Tehran the day opened with small bands
roaming the streets. The Tudeh managed to ransack the Pan-
Iranist Party headquarters ([Keyvani/Djalili] claim credit
for this incident) located near the Majlis Square, and then
there were minor clashes between gangs of the Tudeh and the
Third Force (a Marxist, non-Tudeh opposition group).
Morning papers appeared about as usual, although very
few opposition sheets were available since secret police
were posted in all printing shops. Those papers supporting
Mossadeq announced that the Pahlevi dynasty had come an
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end, while [Ettelaat (despite assurances from its publisher
to support the station's line)] wrote that the nation ex-
pressed its violent disapproval of the coup which was in
foreign interests. [Dad continued its really remarkable
efforts by reprinting the firman and an interview with
Zahedi.] Shahed ran a copy of the firman, and Keyhan ran
two brief notes on Zahedi's claims. Shojat, replacement
for Besuye Ayandeh and, hence, the leading organ of the
Tudeh Party, printed a statement by the Central Committee
of the Tudeh Party--the first such statement to appear for
some weeks. In this statement the party blamed the recent
events on Anglo-American intrigue, and added that the watch-
word for the day must be: "...Down with the Monarchy! Long
live the democratic republic!" During the morning the AP
correspondent wired out a story, destined to get consider-
able play abroad, which included Zahedi's statement to the
officers of the Iranian Army: "Be ready for sacrifice and
loss of your lives for the maintenance of independence and
of the monarchy of Iran and of the holy religion of Islam
which is now being threatened by infidel Communists."
Military communiques read over Radio Tehran indicated
that continuing efforts were being made by the government to
firm up its control. One announcement offered a reward of
100,000 rials for information as the whereabouts of
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General Zahedi, [a second demanded that retired officer
Colonel Abat Farzanegan appear before the military govern-
ment] and a third was a reminder that all demonstrations
were forbidden by the government. At 1030 hours General
Riahi, Chief of Staff, met with the high ranking officers
of the army in the lecture hall of the Military School and
read them the riot act, stressing that they must be faith-
ful to the government.
Personnel at the Tehran Station, while continuing to
make every effort to carry out its decision of the 16th,
were also planning for eventualities. One message to
Headquarters asked that the means for a clandestine evacu-
ation of up to 15 people from Iran be prepared. Another
cited local military opinion that officers would carry out
instructions broadcast by the Shah, and then went on to
put it up to Headquarters as to whether the station should
continue with TPAJAX or withdraw. Nicosia commiserated
over the initial failure and stated that they, personally,
were continuing to do all they could to induce London to
continue to support station efforts. This message was
followed by a report on the Shah's statements at Baghdad,
and by still another to the effect that SIS Nicosia was
asking London's assent to urge the Shah's return on pil-
grimage to the holy shrines in Iraq where he would be in
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direct contact with Iranian divines resident there.
During the afternoon most of the news was not of
action but of statements from various sources. At his
press conference Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi
asserted that there had been serious anti-Shah riots in
Baghdad--a complete lie. At 1500 hours the Shah arrived
in Rome, where he was to make statements to the press which
followed a middle ground. These statements did not dash
the hopes of his supporters, but neither were they a call
to action. Also, in the afternoon, Radio Moscow carried
the text of the appeal of the Central Committee of the
Tudeh Party as it had been printed that morning in Shojat.
In the evening, violence flared in the streets of
Tehran. Just what was the major motivating force is impos-
sible to say, but it is possible to isolate the factors
behind the distrubances. First, the flight of the Shah
brought home to the populace in a dramatic way how far
Mossadeq had gone, and galvanized the people into an irate
pro-Shah force. Second, it seems clear that the Tudey
Party overestimated its strength in the situation. This
fault may have been that of the Soviet liaison people, of
of the leaders of the Tudeh party, or of the rank and file.
During the day the Party not only had defiled statues of
the monarchy, but also had erected their own flags at
certain points. Party members had also torn down street
signs in which the Pahlevi dynasty was mentioned or which
commemorated events in the reign of Reza Shah, and had
replaced them with "popular" names. The party seemed
ready for an all-out effort to bring in a peoples' democ-
racy, believing either that Mossadeq would not challenge
them or that they could outfight him in the streets.
Third, the Mossadeq government was at last beginning to
feel very uneasy about is alliance with the Tudeh Party.
The Pan-Iranists were infuriated and the Third Force was
most unhappy about the situation. Fourth, the climax was
now approaching of the [Keyvani/Djalili] campaign of alleged
Tudeh terrorism. (Details of this campaign have been given
on earlier pages.) On this evening [Keyvani/Djalili] had
gangs of alleged Tudehites on the streets with orders to
loot and smash shops on Lalezar and Amirieh streets when-
ever possible, and to make it clear that this was the Tudeh
in action.
During the evening all these factors came together in
ferment. Security forces were given orders to clear the
streets and serious fighting resulted. Friends of Colonel
[Hamidi] in the Police Department exceeded instructions in
preventing Tudeh vandalism by beating up Tudehites and
shouting for the Shah.
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The Tudeh did seem to take rapid cognizance of the
facts that a covert action was being staged, and that
their members were not strong enough to fight the police.
They brought people out who tried to argue demonstrators
into going home.
Headquarters spend a day featured by depression and
despair. The immediate direction of the project moved
from the Branch and Division to the highest level. At the
end of the morning a handful of people worked on the
draft of a message which was to call off the operation.
As the message was finally sent, in the evening, it was
based on the Department of State's tentative stand:
"that the operation has been tried and failed," the posi-
tion of the United Kingdom that: "we must regret that
we cannot consider going on fighting" and Headquarters'
positon that, in the absence of strong recommendations to
the contrary from Roosevelt and Henderson, operations
against Mossadeq should be discontinued.
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