November 1952-August 1953
CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN
There were no redactions in this section.
S E C R E T III. CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN On the afternoon of 9 June all those who were to take part in the discussions arrived in Beirut: Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief NEA and project chief throughout the operation, came in by plane from London; Carroll came from Cyprus by plane; Roger Goiran, Chief of Station at Tehran, drove on from Damascus by car; and Wilber came in from Cairo by air. On the morning of 10 June the talks got underway and continued for four days. The usual schedule was to start quite early, carry through until about two o'clock, and then assemble again in the late afternoon. The first order of business was a reexamination of all the factors and ele- ments of the political scene in Iran in the light of the current and comprehensive information supplied by the Tehran chief of station. After all the basic principles of the draft paln had been accepted, the attention of the conferees turned to a section by section consideration of the plan. The object of the meetings was to determine how each section could be given the maximum structure and im- pact. One switch in general outlook was made that was most salutary for all later thinking. The draft plan had implied that definite counteraction would have to be taken against some of the strongest elements supporting Mossadeq, such as 12 S E C R E T
S E C R E T the Qashqai tribal leaders; but it was now decided that every effort should be devoted to increasing the size and effectiveness of the anti-Mossadeq forces, the assumption being that Mossadeq's supporting elements would not react once their leader was out of the picture. The Tehran chief of station suggested that an alter- native plan to provide for the overthrow of Mossadeq be developed. This was to become the Amini/Qashqai plan which the station kept alive as a possible alternative until the successful conclusion of TPAJAX. Saturday afternoon the group held its final meeting and on the next morning, 14 June, departed by plane for its several destinations. Roosevelt and Wilber arrived in London on 15 June and reported to the main offices of the SIS at 54 Broadway. They turned over the Beirut revision of the plan. No copy of the original Beirut draft exists, since it was reworked to form the final "London" draft. The London meetings were held in one of the conference rooms at 54 Broadway, notable only for a large sign with the legend in red, "Curb Your Guests." For the SIS, Commander Maurice M. Firth and Norman Darbyshire, who had come on from Nicosia by way of Geneva (where he had seen Asadollah Rashidian a second time before the latter went 13 S E C R E T
S E C R E T back to Iran) were always present. Upon occasion Major P.(Paddy) J. Keen, whose post seemed to be that of desk officer for several Middle East countries, also participated. Montague Woodhouse, clearly one of their most highly esteemed officers, attended a single meeting but had little to con- tribute. From the moment the discussion began, it was clear that the SIS had no major comments of their own on the draft plan. Nor did they have much to say on the Beirut version beyond a certain close attention to phraseology. As at Nicosia it was apparent that the Americans were to be placated and allowed to run things as they pleased. They did, however, seem to have abundant confidence in the plan and in the successful outcome of the operation, and said that the Rashidians would be ordered to follow completely the orders of CIA's Tehran Station. At the final meeting those present reviewed the future conduct of affairs. The SIS officers stated that they thought it would take some time to obtain a firm decision from their government as to the approval or non-approval of the plan. Roosevelt and Wilber left London on 17 June, and Roosevelt was back in his office by noon of the 18th. 14 S E C R E T
S E C R E T There the plan was immediately reconstructed and typed up. (It is given as Appendix B and it should be read at this point in the chronological account of the operation.) 15 S E C R E T